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Abstract
3
The main focus of this thesis is the analysis of political campaigns when candidates 
choose their statements in a strategic way.
In the first chapter, ‘Discretion and renegotiation in electoral campaigns’, I present 
a model of electoral campaigning as a problem of competitive delegation. The chapter 
considers a situation in which there is uncertainty about what the optimal policy 
should be; in this environment voters may want to leave discretion to a candidate, in 
order to allow him to adjust his policies to the state of the world, once he is elected. 
The paper analyses how the ambiguity level of the political statements is influenced by 
the presence of uncertainty over the candidates’ ideology, by the possibility of ex post 
renegotiation between the elected candidate and the voters and by several political 
variables.
In the second chapter, ‘Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage’, joint 
with Stefan Penczynski, we investigate the timing of statements in political debates 
and campaigns. Early statements can influence the political agenda and signal com­
petence and vision, late statements are based on more information about appropriate 
measures. We find that candidates speak early on issues they axe better-informed 
about in order to signal relevance and move them up the agenda. Since opponents 
benefit from this revelation, however, candidates remain silent once their information 
is sufficiently precise and valuable.
In the last chapter, ‘Discretion and ambiguity in electoral campaigns: a look into 
the empirical evidence’, I compare several models of ambiguity in electoral campaigns, 
including my own model which was introduced in the first chapter. I use the method­
ology of Campbell (1983) to have a proxy for ambiguity of the electoral statements, 
and the data from the American National Election Studies on Senate elections from 
1988-1990-1992, to investigate which of the correlations predicted by these models 
seem to be present in the data.
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Elections are an important institution in the life of a democratic country. It is therefore 
important to understand their mechanisms, and how the electoral rules affect their 
outcome. Downs (1957) was the first to develop an analysis of the electoral behaviour 
of voters and candidates moving from the assumption that individuals seek their self 
interest even in an election; in his work, therefore, voters vote for the candidate 
who will implement their preferred policy, and candidates promise to implement the 
policy that will maximise their chances of winning the election. By introducing these 
assumptions he built the basis of the classical theory of elections, and he changed the 
approach to politics by introducing the economic methodology and the use of game 
theory in the field.
Starting from Downs’ work, economists and political scientists have studied in 
details several aspects of elections and electoral campaigns. In this thesis I consider two 
different aspects of the politicians’ strategic behaviour during the electoral campaigns: 
in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 I focus on the vagueness of the candidates’ promises 
during the electoral campaigns and in Chapter 2 I develop a model of timing of their 
announcements.
The analysis of candidates’ ambiguity has been first introduced by Shepsle (1972) 
who showed that candidates may have an incentive to be ambiguous when voters axe 
risk loving. Shepsle’s work was discussed by Page (1976) who criticized in particular 
the assumption that voters are risk loving. Page proposed a different explanation for 
candidates’ ambiguity, obtained by modelling the optimal allocation of emphasis in 
the campaign. In his model, a candidate will optimally take a precise stand on non 
controversial issues, while remaining vague on the more controversial ones; this is due 
to the possibility that his opponent will use any statement on a controversial issue 
against him.
The recent political economy literature contains several alternative explanations 
for the presence of candidates’ ambiguity. The possible causes of ambiguity have 
been identified for example in the uncertainty over the median voter’s policy prefer­
ence (Glazer, 1990), in the incumbent’s willingness to disguise his ideological position 
(Alesina and Cuckierman, 1990), and in the trade-off between moving towards the 
median voter’s position and being more extreme so to increase the campaign contri­
butions (Alesina and Holden, 2008).
Ambiguity in election has been analysed also from an empirical point of view. 
Focusing on American Presidential election, Campbell (1983) and Bartels (1986) pro­
pose two parallel analyses of the effects of uncertainty and ambiguity over the election 
outcome. Campbell searches for the most relevant explanatory variables for the level 
of ambiguity of the politicians. In order to do so, he considers the questions from 
the 1968 to 1980 Presidential elections surveys in which the respondents axe asked
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to position the candidates’ stand on a specific issue on a seven point scale; he then 
estimates the candidates’ ambiguity levels on the different issues as the standard devi­
ation of such positioning. Bartels develops instead a model of survey response under 
the assumption that the respondent places the candidate if he is sufficiently certain 
of his position, and that he refuses to position the candidate if the uncertainty level 
is higher than a certain threshold. By doing so he has an estimate of the uncertainty 
level about the candidate for each respondent and he can focus his analysis only on 
data from one Presidential election.
In the first chapter I analyse an alternative cause of ambiguity. I consider an elec­
toral setting in which two candidates compete for office over a unidimensional policy 
space. Each candidate is characterized by an ideological bias from the median voter 
equal to t j . The political environment is such that the optimal policy does depend on 
a state of the world that will be known only after the election; commitment over the 
electoral promises is assumed. In this case the election itself can be seen as a com­
petitive delegation problem; the voters have to decide whether to leave the candidate 
the freedom to adjust his policy to the realized state of the world or to bind him to a 
specific policy (i.e. the expected value of the optimal policy). Essentially the model 
investigate how the vagueness of the candidates can arise from the median voter’s 
trade-off between the bias coming from the candidate’s ideology and the one coming 
from the variability of the state of the world. In this case there is no policy conver­
gence between the candidates, and the candidates optimally commit to a policy set 
and not to a specific policy. The chapter also investigates how the level of candidates’ 
vagueness changes in presence of asymmetries in the biases, when we introduce un­
certainty over the candidates’ ideological positions, and when renegotiation is allowed 
after observing the state of the world.
In the third chapter I investigate how the implications of several models of ambi­
guity relate to the empirical evidence. I consider the National Election Studies dataset 
on the Senate Elections from 1988 to 1992. Following the methodology introduced 
by Campbell (1983) I measure ambiguity as the standard deviation of the candidate’s 
position on a seven points liberal-conservative scale as perceived by the voters. I 
then present a descriptive analysis of the empirical correlations between the level of 
candidate’s ambiguity and other relevant variables, such as the dispersion of voter’s 
preferences, or the incumbent’s approval rate, or the uncertainty over the state of 
the National Economy. I compare these empirical correlations with the implications 
of four models of ambiguity: the one contained in Chapter 1, Alesina and Cuckier- 
man (1990), Chappell (1994) and Glazer (1990) to have a first look into the level of 
consistency with the data that the different models display.
The second aspect of the electoral campaigns that I consider in this thesis is the 
optimal timing of electoral announcements. The related literature includes papers on 
the effect of media on the public opinion, as Berliant and Konishi (2005) who model
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the campaign debate so to consider the effects of the salience of the topics when they 
were discussed by the politicians. Amoros and Puy (2007) assume that parties spend 
resources on one of two salient issues, and focus on whether parties spend resources on 
the same or on different topics; this papers are related to the influence of candidates’ 
on the debate through the media channel. Closer to the model proposed in Chapter 
2 are Levy and Razin (2009, 2010) who model agenda formation as a result of costly 
influence seeking of two candidates.
The second chapter, which draws on joint work with Stefan P. Penczynski, pro­
poses a model of timing of electoral announcements in which the timing is important 
both to candidates and voters for informational reasons. In this model we study the 
effect of having a specialised incumbent on the electoral outcome when there is a mul­
tidimensional policy space. We focus on the incumbent’s trade-off between speaking 
early so to influence the focus of the electoral campaign, and taking a late stand to 
preserve his strategic positioning. In particular we analyse the effects that the level 
of specialisaton has on the voters’ welfare, measured as the probability of electing a 
politician who implements the best policy on the most relevant issue.
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1 D iscretion and renegotiation in 
electoral campaigns
1.1 In trod u ction
Vagueness of electoral campaign statements is a common element of the political 
competition and a widely studied phenomenon in political science and economics.
Consider the following anedoctal evidence from past Italian elections. During the 
electoral campaign in 2001 Berlusconi signed in front of the population the so called 
Contract with the Italians. An example of its contents was the following point about 
taxes:
“First: the reduction of the fiscal burden with total exemption for incomes 
up to 22 million of Italian liras per year, the reduction of the tax rate for 
incomes up to 200 million to 23%; the reduction of the tax rate for incomes 
above 200 million to 33%.”1
Clearly, this is quite a precise statement. Now, let’s consider what Berlusconi 
promised about taxes in the 2008 electoral campaign. Presenting his electoral program, 
the “Seven missions to relaunch Italy”, he said:
“[...] our first promise is that we will not steal money from the Italians 
and that we will reduce the fiscal burden below 40% of the GDP.”2
It is easy to argue that the second statement is more vague than the first one, 
since it doesn’t quantify the tax reduction precisely, does not specify who will gain, 
and simply imposes a bound on the politician’s actions. The second promise allows the 
candidate to retain more freedom in the post-election implementation of the policy. It 
would be interesting to understand what changes in the political arena that induces 
Berlusconi to release a more vague statement in his 2008 campaign. This paper 
provides a simple model in which such comparative analysis can be made explicit, and 
the description of some of the political variables that can affect the precision of the 
electoral statements can be identified.
I study a model in which ambiguity of the electoral promises results in an elemen­
tary fashion from a “delegation objective”: depending on how changing the environ­
ment is, the tension between rigidity and discretion that the electorate experiences
1In the original language: “Punto primo: Abbattimento della pressione fiscale con l’esenzione totale 
dei redditi fino a 22 milioni di lire annui; riduzione al 23 per cento dell’aliquota per i redditi fino a 
200 milioni; riduzione al 33 per cento dell’aliquota per i redditi sopra i 200 milioni.” From “Corriere 
della Sera”, online version, 3rd March 2008.
2In the original language: “[...] la nostra prima promessa [.. .] e che non metteremo mai le mani 
nelle tasche degli italiani e che abbasseremo la pressione fiscale sotto il 40% del PiI.”From “Corriere 
della Sera”, online version, 29th February 2008.
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may be resolved with voters having a preference for some degree of discretion. In this 
way they leave the politicians free to operate in a particular policy region once they 
are elected, so as to target their policy better to the particular state of the world. In 
particular, the level of discretion that the voters are willing to concede to the can­
didates is inversely related to their bias (where the bias is defined with respect to 
the median voter’s preferences). Moreover, the welfare of the electorate depends, in 
the vast majority of cases, only on the characteristics of the most biased candidate, 
where the good candidate’s characteristics become relevant when the opponent is too 
extreme to be a credible competitor. I analyse how this delegation effect modifies 
the structure of the optimal campaign promises when there is uncertainty over the 
politicians’ preferences and on the variability of the state of the world; the analysis is 
developed with a particular attention at the interplay between the delegation aspects 
of the electoral campaign, and the competition effects. The same tension, although 
in a different setting, is described by Battigalli and Maggi (2002) where the authors 
analyse the determinants of discretion and rigidity in incomplete contracts, in the 
presence of writing costs. The findings are ambiguous in determining the relation be­
tween the level of discretion and the uncertainty over the candidates’ types; in some 
parametric regions an increase in the uncertainty over the candidate’s types decreases 
the level of discretion that the voters’ are willing to leave, as one would expect given 
that the voters are risk averse. In other parametric regions, however, the effect is the 
opposite and more uncertainty implies more discretion for the candidates; this is due 
to an insurance effect that the bounds on the set of promises exert: increasing the 
upper or lower bound (depending on whether the candidate is right-wing, or left-wing) 
has the effect of giving more discretion to good candidates’ types, and not so much to 
bad candidates’ types, who will hit the bound more often and will be constrained by 
it anyway.
I also consider how the actual discretion that a candidate can retain changes when 
the possibility of ex-post renegotiation is introduced. Introducing the possibility of 
renegotiating under certain conditions the campaign promises modifies the structure 
of the problem in a way which makes the comparison of two sets of promises in terms 
of levels of discretion less intuitive.
In this paper a statement is defined more vague (or, equivalently, leaving more 
discretion to the candidate) than another one if it allows for more policies to be im­
plemented. For example the statement: “The policy will be p*” is less vague than a 
statement such as “The policy will be at most p*”. When renegotiation is indeed pos­
sible the set of promises influences the ex post implemented policy through two chan­
nels: it changes what policies are allowed without renegotiation, but it also changes 
the likelihood and the extent of the possible renegotiation. Therefore a smaller set of 
promises is not necessarily a less permissive one, and a deeper analysis is required; 
whether one set is more or less ambiguous therefore will depend on the conditions 
under which renegotiation is allowed.
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The renegotiation analysis is introduced by allowing full renegotiation, under the 
constraint that the median voter cannot have a lower utility than the highest one he 
would have without renegotiation. In the full renegotiation benchmark case, given the 
uniformly distributed state of the world, a continuum of equivalent sets of promises 
can be implemented. After that, possible contraints to the renegotiation process are 
introduced; nice results are obtained when there are convex costs of renegotiation that 
depend on the distance between the renegotiated policy and the promised set. In this 
case more extreme politicians are the ones with the largest incentives to constrain 
themselves ex ante, while renegotiating and implementing more extreme policies ex 
post. Notice that this is fully anticipated by the voters, and therefore it’s not a fooling 
process but an equilibrium phenomenon.
Several papers analyse the causes of ambiguous statements in electoral campaigns. 
In his seminal work Shepsle (1972) analyses an electoral competition where a chal­
lenger can choose to be ambiguous in order to win against an incumbent who presents 
himself with a point policy. Shepsle shows that an ambiguous statement may be pre­
ferred to the median voter’s preferred outcome, when many voters are risk loving. 
If the majority of voters axe risk averse, Black’s median voter theorem still applies, 
and ambiguity decreases the candidate’s appeal at least els long as the majority of 
voters axe risk averse. Page (1976) wrote a critique of Shepsle’s model, stressing two 
problematic assumptions. In particular, he challenged the plausibility of individuals 
being risk loving, and candidates using lotteries. He viewed political statements not as 
distributions over the possible policies, but more as subsets of the possible outcomes, 
as appears from his writing: “This interpretation is supported by candidates’ frequent 
proclamations of what they don’t stand for [... ] as if they were putting boundaries 
on their ambiguity, within a range of risk acceptance.”3 Starting from this observa­
tion, he proposes a different explanation for the ambiguity of a politician’s statement, 
based on the optimal allocation of emphasis and politicians’ resources in the electoral 
campaign. Page considers multidimensional policies, and assumes that candidates can 
only partially control the emphasis that is put on their statements. In this setting, 
therefore, a candidate will find it optimal to be precise on non controversial issues, 
and to be vague on issues that axe controversial, because any detailed statement on a 
controversial issue can be used against him by his opponent.
There are many recent works on vagueness in electoral campaigns. Most of the 
models present ambiguity as a candidate-driven phenomenon, which arises despite 
voters being ambiguity averse. These works are somehow tangential to the objective 
of this paper in which ambiguity arises rather directly from the joint uncertainty 
of the candidates and the voters. In particular, Glazer (1990) models ambiguity 
as generated by uncertainty on the bliss point of the median voter. Alesina and 
Cuckierman (1990) explain ambiguity as a device to conceal, at least partially, a
3Page (1976)
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politician’s ideology; in their setting the incumbent can choose the level of ambiguity 
of his actions to avoid being locked in his ideological position, and losing votes in 
the subsequent election. Aragones and Neeman (2000) have similar results which 
exploit the candidate’s tradeoff between committing to his most preferred strategy 
to increase his own utility ex post, and committing to the median voter’s preferred 
point to maximize the probability of being elected; ambiguous promises arise as an 
optimal solution to this tradeoff.4 Meirowitz (2005) has a model of primaries in which 
candidates may choose strategically to remain ambiguous because they are aware of 
the fact that in the future they will become better informed on the preferences of the 
voters. Alesina and Holden (2008) model ambiguity in electoral campaigns as arising 
from a trade-off that the candidates face between moving towards the median voter’s 
preferred outcome, to increase the chances of being elected, and taking a more extreme 
stand, to have more campaign contributions which help influencing the median voter’s 
position.
In this paper, the vagueness of the electoral statements arises in a natural way 
from a competitive delegation environment; the main objective of the paper is to see 
the consequences of this fairly standard way to generate ambiguity and to have a 
model which can be used to analyse the effect that several political variables have 
on the ambiguity levels of an electoral campaign. It is also worth noting that the 
form of ambiguity which features in my model is the one which Page found more 
appealing: ambiguous politicians simply put bounds on their own actions, and don’t 
specify precisely which policy they will choose in the set of the possible ones.
In the setting I analyse, both the candidates and the voters have a joint interest in 
discretion; this has similar effects to those described by Alonso and Matouschek (2008). 
They analyse the problem of an uninformed principal who wants to delegate an action 
to an informed agent; the authors characterise the optimal delegation as a function 
of the relationship between the agent’s and the principal’s preferences; the authors 
are interested in understanding the nature of the optimal delegation set, and derive 
that, if the agents’ preferences are sufficiently aligned, interval delegation is optimal. 
These findings are compatible with the results contained in Section 1.2 of this chapter. 
Since in this model candidates’ and voters’ preferences are assumed to be aligned 
sufficiently, median voter’s utility maximisation problem under complete information 
replicates the findings of Alonso and Matouschek. However, given the more detailed 
set of assumptions, this paper analyses in detail the effect of competition between 
candidates in the final choice of the set of promises, the consequences of incomplete 
information on the candidates’ biases and the consequences of ex post renegotiation, 
after the realisation of the state of the world is observed.
As for many delegation models, voters can benefit from discretion. Indeed, there 
is now evidence that ambiguity might not be fully disliked by voters. Tomz and
4Other related works by Aragones includes Aragones et al. (2005) and Aragones and Postlewaite 
(2002).
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Houweling (2009) present an experimental setting in which they show that ambiguous 
candidates are not less likely to win the election even when they tie with the opponent 
in terms of the (expected) proposed policy; ambiguous candidates may even be more 
likely to win than unambigous ones when they belong to a specific party.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the static version of 
the model, the settings, the description of the state of the world, and of the agents’ 
preferences. It then shows the equilibria in this setting, under the assumption that 
the preferences (types) of the politicians are known to the voters. Section 1.3 anal­
yses what happens if there is some uncertainty on the types of the politician with a 
particular focus on the comparative statics which describe what happens to the level 
of ambiguity of the campaign if we change the level of uncertainty on the politicians’ 
types. Section 1.4 introduces the problem of renegotiation, and discusses what rene­
gotiation can mean in an electoral campaign setting, presenting how the renegotiation 
process differs depending on the limits to renegotiation that exist in the electoral 
system; in particular I study how renegotiation affects the set of promises and the 
effective implemented policies ex post.
1.2 T h e m od el
I consider a political system characterized by two parties, L  and R, competing in one 
election. The electoral competition is based on one unidimensional policy decision 
p € M. The environment is characterised by a state of the world, u j , which influences 
the optimal choice of the candidates and the preferences of the voters.
The electoral period is divided into three different stages:
Campaign stage: the candidates simultaneously announce their platforms. They 
can choose whether to announce a specific policy (a point) or some larger set of 
policies.
Voting stage: each voter casts his vote.
Office stage: the state of the world uj is realized and the appointed candidate im­
plements a policy.
The state of the world uj is unknown in the first two stages, and realised in the 
office stage. I assume that both the voters and the candidates know the state of the 
world ex post. The value of uj is a random variable distributed uniformly over [—q, q\.
During the campaign stage each candidate announces a set of policies P  to which 
his future policy will belong. We assume P  to be a closed set. In the first specification 
of the model a candidate cannot choose a policy outside the announced set P  C R. 
This is meant to be a reduced form of a multiperiod model in which if the candidate 
does not keep his word he will be punished in future election periods.5 Section 1.4
5An example of such a model is given by Aragones et al. (2005). For the main issues related to 
dynamic version of electoral models see Alesina (1988).
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partially relaxes this assumption introducing the possibility of ex-post renegotiation 
of the promise between the appointed candidate and the voters.
The optimal policy for the candidates and the voters depends on their ideological 
type and on the state of the world u.
Voters care about which policy is implemented; each voter has a bliss point that 
depends on the realisation of the state of the world and on his ideological type. Calling 
p the policy that is implemented, voter i ’s preferences are described by the following 
quadratic loss function:
Ui{p) = - ( t i  + u - p ) 2
where U is the type of the voter and U +  u  is his preferred policy given the state of 
the world. The median voter’s type tm is common knowledge and normalised to zero.
There axe two types of candidates: candidate L, with ideological type t l  G [—1,0], 
and candidate R , with ideological type t r  € [0,1]. Candidates have utility only from 
being in power; moreover, once they are in power, they suffer a disutility if they are 
not able to implement their preferred policy. Once elected, they axe constrained by 
the promises they made in the campaign stage. Therefore the utility function that 
represents the preferences of candidate j  € {L, R} is:
Uj(p,u) =  P r(j  is elected|P(Tj),Tj)[if — (r  ^+ u  — p)2].
where K  is the candidate’s rent from being in power and P(rj)  is candidate j ’s set of 
promises.
A strategy for candidate j  is a function:
Sj : ( t j , u )
with j  = L, R. The function Sj associates a set of promises and an implemented 
policy to every pair of ideology and realisation of the state of the world. Notice that 
the set of promises P  can depend only on the candidate’s ideology because the state 
of the world is not known ex ante. Therefore there are no signalling issues in the 
decision of the set P.
I will consider only equilibria in pure strategies. In this case, provided that K  
is large enough, the candidate behaves as if he had lexicographic preferences and he 
cared first about being elected and then about which policy he is able to implement, 
as the probability of being elected is either 0 or  ^ or 1. Consider now a candidate who 
changes his strategy from (Pi, pi (a;)) to (P2 ,P2 (^))- This change can either affect the 
probability of being elected or not. If it does not affect it, the candidate will choose 
the new strategy if it allows him to implement his preferred policy more often ex post; 
if it does change his probability, the candidate will choose the set of promises that 
allows him to have the greater probability of being elected, regardless of the constraint
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that this set may impose ex post on his actions: if K  is large enough, \ K  is greater
than any possible gain that can be obtained from changing the set of promises.
From now on, we will assume that K  is sufficiently large, and most of the analysis 
will focus on candidate R  as the analysis for candidate L is similar, with opposite 
signs.
1.2.1 C andidate’s behaviour once elected
For the moment we will assume that the candidates are commiting to their set of 
promises, which is equivalent to say that there is a restriction on the strategy space 
that imposes that p(rj,cj) € P(Tj). This assumption will be relaxed in section 1.4.
Assume that candidate R  has been elected after he promised P ( t r ) in the cam­
paign stage. His optimal behaviour once elected, given that he is constrained to choose 
a policy in the set P ( t r ), is to choose t r  4- u  if t r  +  uj G P ( t r ), and to choose the 
policy p 6 P ( t r ) that minimises the distance between p and t r  + u  otherwise. For 
example if P ( t r ) = (—oo,p], the optimal strategy ex post for the candidate is to 
choose t r  +  u  when t r  + u  < p and p otherwise. Whenever a candidate is indiffer­
ent between two policies, we assume that he chooses in a way that makes his best 
response function upper hemicontinuous. For example, if P ( t r ) =  (—oo, a] U [b, oo) 
the candidate’s best response will be to choose t r  +  u  if t r  + lj G P ( t r ), to choose 
a  if a  <  t r  -|- u  < and to choose b otherwise.
1.2.2 Voters’ behaviour
Voters in this model observe the set of promises made by each candidate. Since they 
know each candidate’s type, they choose the candidate that maximises their expected 
utility EUi(Tj, P(Tj)). Given that the voters are risk averse, as shown in Shepsle 
(1972), Black’s median voter theorem applies; therefore the winning candidate is the 
one which maximises the expected utility of the median voter EUm(Tj, P(Tj)). As a 
tie-breaking rule, I assume that whenever a voter is indifferent between two candidates 
he chooses the one whose ideology (type) is closer to his own, and he randomises with 
equal probabilities between the candidates if they have the same bias.6
The next proposition characterises the optimal promises. It shows that the optimal 
promise is an interval in the politician’s policy space, which prevents the politician 
from undertaking actions towards which he is biased. For example, a right-winged 
politician’s set of promises will sound like the following statement: “I will not imple­
ment a policy to the right of policy p*n. Define p*R, and p*L as follows:
q - T L  if \t l \ < q 
otherwise
q -  t r  if TR < q  
0 otherwise
6 This tie-breaking rule is chosen to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium in pure strategies 
in a way that is analogous to a Bertrand problem with asymmetric costs.
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Proposition 1 A promise of candidate R  that is optimal for the median voter is 
P ( t r ) = [—q,p*ft]; a promise of candidate L that is optimal for the median voter is 
P ( t l ) = [p£><z]- These sets are not the unique optimal promises, but every other 
optimal set differs from the ones above only by including or excluding actions that will 
never be implemented by the candidate, regardless of the state of the world.
Sketch of proof. (See the appendix for the complete proof.) To show that 
the statement of the proposition is true, I procede in two steps. First I show that 
the optimal set of promises, when we restrict it not to include policies which will be 
implemented with zero probability, must be an interval, then I derive the optimal 
bounds of the interval.
The first step can be proved by showing that the presence of any gap in the set 
of promises is equivalent to a mean preserving spread on the ex post actions of the 
candidate. Therefore a gap is suboptimal for the median voter, given his risk aversion.
Note that candidate R :s set of promises must have no effective lower bound, and 
candidate L’s must have no upper bound. In fact, the median voter doesn’t want to 
prevent a right-wing politician from implementing a leftist policy because he’ll do so 
only when the median voter would have liked an even more leftist one (and viceversa). 
In practice, the sets of promises may be bounded, given that the support of the 
distribution of the state of the world itself is bounded; however, the lower bound of 
candidate i?’s set of promises must be at most — q and the upper bound of candidate 
L’s set of promises must be at least q. For proof purposes we will assume the set of 
promises to be bounded, but this is ex post equivalent to the unbounded case. Then I 
find the pi by minimising the median voter’s disutility given the type of the politician. 
Intuitively the lower bound can be found with the following argument. Consider what 
happens when you set p =  q — t r ] the distance between the implemented policy and 
the state of the world (where p is a function of u) is represented in the following graph:
I p H  -  w
tr
qi*p
Figure 1: Optimal bound
Notice that the distance is never greater than t r , and that the distance at u) =  q, 
Ip {q) ~ q\ = t r - Let’s now consider what happens if p < q — t r , or when p > q — t r .
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\ p ( u j ) - u \  \ p [ ( j ) - u \
t r t r
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Figure 2: Suboptiraal bounds
The figures show that in both cases, we increase the distance for some values of 
uj , and decrease it for other values of however, given the assumption that u> is 
uniformly distributed, and given that the length of the segment where the distance 
is reduced is smaller than the lenght of the segment where it is increased, we can 
conclude that p* = q — t r  is the optimal bound.
In order to formally find the optimal bound I analyse the median voter’s disutility, 
which is a piecewise function defined over three different intervals. If you consider 
the evaluation of candidate R's set of promises, the expected disutility of the median 
voter is defined over the three intervals presented in the following figure:
|----------------------------------------------- 1------------------1---------------------------> V
T R ~ q  r R  +  q
Figure 3: Intervals in the complete information case
If the bound is very low (in particular if p <  t r  — q), it will be binding for any 
possible realisation of the state of the world; in this case the expected disutility for 
the median voter is simply a function of the expected distance between the bound 
and the state of the world. On the contrary, if the bound is very high it will never be 
binding, and the median voter’s disutility only depends on the candidate’s bias; this 
happens if p >  t r  + q. For intermediate values of p the expected disutility function 
incorporates both the variables.
1.2.3 Analysis of the equilibria
Consider now the electoral competition between the two candidates in two different 
cases.
Both candidates have the same distance from the median voter Assume 
that, from the median voter’s point of view, both candidates’ ideologies are the same, 
that is \ t l \  =  | t # | ;  in this case the only equilibrium in pure strategies is the following: 
candidate R  promises P { t r ) — [— and candidate L  promises P { t l ) =
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where p!-, for j  = L ,R  is:
, . . {  9 - W  if N < ,
I 0 otherwise
where p*L < 0 < p*R and each candidate wins with probability If we consider any 
other pair of strategies, there is at least one candidate who has an incentive to deviate 
by increasing the utility of the median voter and thus winning with certainty.
The candidates have different distances from the median voter. Suppose 
that candidate L’s ideological type is closer to the median voter’s preferences than 
candidate i?’s: \ t l \  <  \ t r \ .
The median voter will choose the candidate that can ensure him the lowest ex­
pected disutility; moreover, as a tie-breaking rule, which is necessary to guarantee 
the existence of an equilibrium, the median voter will select the candidate with the 
smallest bias whenever the two candidates will give him the same expected disutility.7
The unique equilibrium is therefore the following: candidate R  promises P  ( t r )  =  
[ — <7, P r ] ,  and candidate L  wins by promising P ( t l )  =  [pz,, q],  where
p * f  q ~ TR if t r  <  q
1 0 otherwise
and p l  is the preferred policy bound of candidate L between the two bounds that 
make the median voter indifferent between L and R\ that is, p l  is the maximum zero 
of the following equation:
E U m  ( T R , P R )  =  E U m (t l . p l ) •
Intuitively, candidate L, when competing with a more extreme type, can buy him­
self more freedom and still leave the median voter indifferent between him and his 
opponent.
Notice that candidate L has as in the original problem an incentive to announce a 
set of promises which has the shape of an interval. The intuition is easy to understand: 
immagine that instead of an interval the set of promises has a hole. The same set 
of promises without the hole will be preferred both by the median voter and by the 
candidate because the ex post policy the first case is a mean preserving spread of the 
case in which the set is an interval. The formal proof is an analogous of the proof of 
Proposition 1.
If the bias of the extreme candidate is too large compared to the bias of his 
opponent, it can be the case that, for every p i  the following inequality holds:
7The median voter randomizes with equal probability between the two candidates if they have the 
same bias and induce the same expected utility.
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EUm ( TR,p*R) <  EUm (t l .Pl ) •
In this case P l  = t l  — q, candidate L  is elected and the median voter has a higher 
expected utility than the one promised by candidate R.
Equilibrium discretion From the previous equilibrium analysis it is possible to 
observe that the introduction of asymmetries in the candidates’ types leads to an 
increase in the ambiguity level of the announcements. This happens because the power 
relation between the different agents of the model changes depending on the symmetry 
or asymmetry of the candidates’ positions. When the candidates are symmetrically 
positioned with respect to the median voter, the desire to be elected forces them to 
promise the median voter’s most preferred set. When the situation is asymmetric, the 
less extreme candidate retains more discretion for himself, because the median voter 
has no good outside option; this happens because the type of the other candidate 
is more extreme. Ambiguity appears in this model because of the voters’ desire of 
delegating the policy choices to an informed candidate; however in this analysis the 
level of discretion that a winning candidate can manage to keep for himself is often 
greater than the one which is optimal for the voters themselves, due to the competition 
with a possibly more biased politician.
Comparative statics In general, the level of discretion that the candidates can 
retain for themselves decreases with their bias. However, it is not always the case 
that the overall level of discretion goes down when one of the biases increases. Let’s 
analyse the different situations in detail:
•  \ t r \  =  \ t l \ =  a  and a  increases: if we are in a symmetric equilibrium and we 
move to another symmetric situation with larger biases the level of candidates’ 
discretion weakly decreases. In particular, it decreases unless the amount of 
discretion is already at its minimum in equilibrium (where Pl — PR = 0).
•  kftl = \ t l \  and t r  increases: candidate R  is now the extreme one; this will 
decrease i?’s level of discretion ( p r  goes down) and increase L’s level of discretion 
(pL goes down as well), given that L  find himself in a more favourable position 
than before.
•  \t l \ < | |  and \t l \ increases slightly (so that the order of the biases is pre­
served): this will reduce the discretion that t l  can ensure for himself ( p l  in­
creases), and it will not affect candidate i?’s behaviour at all; the expected utility 
of the median voter is left unchanged.
•  \ t l \  <  |t r | and t r  increases: the effect on the ambiguity level is twofold: i?’s 
discretion decreases, as p r  does; on the contrary, given that his opponent’s type
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is worsened, L’s discretion increases as pl decreases; the expected utility of the 
median voter goes down.
• the level of discretion is for every candidate weakly increasing in the uncertainty 
on the underlying state of the world (which in this case can be parametrized by 
«)•
A  shift in the median voter position It seems natural to ask ourselves what 
happens when the median voter’s preferences shift, for example, to the right. In the 
model this question is ill-posed, since the median voter’s preferences are assumed to 
be given. But we can interpret the position of the median voter as a normalization. 
In this case, a shift to the right of the median voter would be perceived as a shift to 
the left of the candidates’ types. The consequences of this shift would be that R  can 
retain more discretion than before, and L can retain less (both pl and pr  increase).
Berlusconi: an example Consider again the example introduced at the beginning 
of the paper. In the 2001 campaign, Berlusconi promised a very specific reduction of 
the income tax, explaining in detail the income brackets that would have benefited 
from the reduction, and the entity of the reduction. In the 2008 campaign, Berlusconi 
chose a different approach: he still promised a tax reduction, but he did not focus 
on the income tax anymore, and he promised a generic reduction of the fiscal burden 
below 40%. Although not directly comparable in terms of dimension, both policies 
belong to a right-wing vision of the State that should provide less services and ask 
smaller contributions. However, in the second case, Silvio Berlusconi did not identify 
which taxes he wanted to reduce, and which income groups he planned to target. So, 
what changed between the two electoral campaigns that can explain the second more 
ambiguous approach? The above analysis suggests us two potential candidates:
1 . an increase in q: the 2008 campaign was run after the beginning of the financial 
crisis; although the crisis itself had not reached its peak yet, there was plausibly 
more uncertainty on the state of the economy than in 2 0 0 1 . 8
2 . a shift of the median voter preferences to the right: in 2008 the main right-wing 
parties collected around 49.5% of the votes9 while in 2001 the equivalent set of 
parties (corrected for changes in names, and merges) only collected about 46% 
of the votes10 which supports the view that the median voter shifted to the right 
between the two elections.
8Notice that it doesn’t matter whether the support of the distribution of u) increases in a symmetric 
or asymmetric fashion, as we normalized E(u>) =  0.
9PDL 37.4%, LEGA NORD 8.3%, MOVIMENTO PER AUTONOMIA DEL SUD 1.1%, LA DE- 
STRA 2.4%, FORZA NUOVA 0.3%. Data from the Ministero degli Interni website.
10FORZA ITALIA 29.4%, AN 12%, LEGA NORD 3.9%, FIAMMA TRICOLORE 0.4, FORZA 
NUOVA 0.1%. Data from the Ministero degli Interni website.
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1.2.4 Welfare
Each voter i is characterised by a type ti which represents his preferences; in particular, 
given U, u  and the implemented policy p, voter z’s utility function is:
Ui(p) = -(U  + uj - p ) 2.
Therefore the overall expected welfare of the electorate is:
E W  = -  f  r  i + “— p)2dF(ti)du>,
J —q J —o o  Q
where F{ti) is the distribution of the voters’ types. Given the independence as­
sumption on the distribution of uj and U we can rewrite the welfare as follows:
E W  = - E ( t 2) -  2E{u -  p)E(ti) -  E{{uj -  p)2).
Notice now that E((u — p)2) in equilibrium depends, generically, only on the type 
of the most extreme candidate: the candidate with the smallest bias with respect to 
the median voter preferences, will choose a set of promises that leaves the median 
voter indifferent between his opponent and himself. Therefore E{(ui — p)2) is just the 
optimised median voter’s utility, when facing the candidate with the most extreme 
bias. If the voter’s types are distributed in a symmetric fashion, so that E{U) = 0 
as well, the expected welfare (but the reasoning holds for the ex post welfare as well) 
simply depends on the “worst” politician, and not on the type of the best one. If 
E(ti) = 0, we have
E W  = - E ( t } ) - E ( ( u - p ) 2)-,
given that E((u> — p)2) is pinned down by the characteristics of the extreme candi­
date, and considering that E{t2) is related only to the voters’ preferences, the welfare 
is completely independent of the elected candidate’s quality (bias).
The only case in which the type of the good candidate matters in the voters’ 
expected welfare is when the bad candidate is so biased that the good one can set 
\P\ ~  \Tg\ +  9 s where r g is his type, thus retaining all the discretion that is relevant. 
In this case the expected welfare is:
E W  =  E(ti -  Tg)2, 
and it depends on the elected candidate’s bias.
1.3 U n certa in ty
In this section I consider the case in which the type of the candidate is uncertain. I will 
focus only on pooling equilibria to understand the effects of uncertainty on candidates’
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discretion, disentangling them from the possible signaling effects. For simplicity I will 
assume that candidate R  has type r — x  with probability \  and type r +  x  with 
probability ^.n  In this case r =  E ( t r ),  and the parameter x  describes the variability 
of i?’s type around the mean. The symmetric assumption holds for L.
To study the effect of the uncertainty on the optimal behaviour of the politicians 
I will first consider, for a given expected bias r and uncertainty level x,  what is the 
best set of promises that the candidate can announce in order to please the median 
voter. The analysis will then focus on the case of symmetric equilibria, where both 
the absolute value of the bias and the level of the uncertainty are constant across 
candidates; finally, I will discuss the asymmetric case and its comparative statics.
1.3.1 C andidate’s behaviour once elected
The winning candidate’s behaviour after election is obviously the same as in section 
1.2. The behaviour of the voters changes with uncertainty about the candidates’ types. 
Section 1.3.2 investigates how this behaviour is affected. Notice, however, that if only 
pooling equilibria axe considered, the optimal set of promises is still an interval.
1.3.2 Voters’ behaviour
As in the previous analysis, the median voter chooses the candidate with the set of 
promises that gives him the lower expected disutility; to break ties, when he is indif­
ferent between candidates he chooses first the one who is less biased in expectation; 
if the candidates have the same bias he chooses the one whose type is less variable, 
and he randomises if they also have the same variability. The median voter’s expected 
disutility is now the weighted sum of the expected disutility when the type is r  — x  and 
when the type is r +  x.  From the above discussion, the reduced form of the expected 
disutility when the type is t  ± x  is:
^  +  P r  if P R <  r ± x - q
1 (  \  ~  ~  i  ( T  X ) 3 ~  P R Q 2 +  P'r Q \  - r  [ 1, , i  J  , / i \2  i fpKe [ r ± x - 9 , T ± x  +  9]y \  + q {T ± x )  + p R { r ± x )  J
(r ±  x ) 2 if pn> r  ± x  +  q
Given that the objective function is a weighted average of the two disutilities above, 
it is defined over five intervals. Depending on whether q  is smaller or greater than 
x , the order of the bounds of these intervals differs, therefore the objective function 
is different in the two cases. However, the case in which q <  x  is not interesting: it 
can trivially be shown that the optimal bound is given by p r  = p l  = 0. The result is 
intuitive, because q <  x  implies that leaving any form of discretion to the candidate in
11 Notice that it must be that r >  x, since we are keeping the assumption that the candidate is a 
right candidate, so both r  — x and r +  x belong to the interval [0 , 1].
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the direction of his bias does not compensate the variability of the state of the world, 
but exposes the median voter to the candidate’s bias.
Let’s therefore consider the case in which the state of the world is more variable 
than the type of the candidate, that is q > x. The median voter’s expected disutility 
is a weighted average of the disutility given by a candidate who has type r + x ,  and the 
disutility the voter gets from a candidate with type r — x. Therefore it is a piecewise 
function defined over the following intervals:
— I------------------ 1-------------------- 1------------------1—
r —x —q r + x —q r —x + q  r + x + q 
Figure 4: Intervals with uncertainty
V
When the promised upper bound p is smaller than r — x  — q, it is so low that it 
is always binding, no matter what the type of the politician and the realisation of the 
state of the world are; this implies that the candidate always chooses the policy p , and 
the expected disutility is simply a function of the distance between p and the state 
of the world. Symmetrically, on the other side of the spectrum, if the bound is large 
enough (in particular if p > r  + x +  q) it will never be binding for any candidate in any 
state of the world; in this case the expected disutility depends only on the bias of the 
politician. For intermediate values, p is less binding for a candidate with type r — x 
than it is for a candidate with type r  + x. In particular if p E  (r — x — q, r +  x  — q) 
the constraint is still binding for r  + x  in any state of the world, while this is no longer 
true for r  — X] if p E (r +  x — q, r  — x +  q) both candidates will be constrained by p 
only in some states of the world; finally if p E  (r — x  +  q, r +  x  +  q) the promise will 
never be binding for a type r  — x  candidate, while it will bind a type r +  x  candidate 
in some states of the world.
The complete analysis of this optimisation problem is contained in Appendix A.2 , 
which also contains the functional form of the expected disutility function. The Ap­
pendix discusses the behaviour of the function in each one of the five regions described 
above; the optimal solution is the following:
P r =  <i
,2^ if t < ^ 3 = ^z q —xq -  (r2 +  x 2)
3 q — ^ 8 q2 +  ( r  — 1 if r  G
0  otherwise
Notice that as x —> 0 the solution converges to the complete information one, with 
the middle region disappearing as q +  x  —► q and —► q.
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1.3.3 Equilibrium analysis: sym m etric equilibria
Let’s consider the easiest case in which t r  =  — t l  =  t  and x r  = x l • Let’s define 
Px = P r ~  ~ P l• this case
p  =  <
g - ( r 2 + x 2) 2 if r < 2 2^ -, q > x
3g -  (8q2 +  (r -  a;)2) if r G + x
0  otherwise
, q > x
where p*L < 0  < p*R.
Both candidates have exactly the same attractiveness ex-ante from the median 
voter’s perspective. They therefore propose symmetric platforms, and each one wins 
with probability | .
The comparison of this solution with the one obtained under complete information 
leads to some interesting considerations about the links between the uncertainty on 
the type of the candidate and the discretion that the voter wants to leave him.
The first notable point is that the candidates can always retain some discretion for 
themselves. This is due to the fact that some information (whether the candidate is 
right-wing or left-wing) is always common knowledge: as a consequence, a right-wing 
candidate will always be allowed to implement policies that are ex-ante perceived as 
leftist, and viceversa.
Effects of the introduction o f uncertainty. If the type is less variable than the 
state of the world, there are conditions under which the median voter leaves some 
discretion to the candidate. More interestingly, if we move from a case in which 
the candidate’s type is known to be r, to one in which it is expected to be r (if, for 
example, it is r +  x, or r — x  with equal probability) the level of discretion can increase 
or decrease, depending on the parameters. For example i f g < r < g  +  0.1,p =  0 i f  
x = 0, while p  =  Sq — ( s q 2 + (r — O.l)2  ^ if x = 0.1: more discretion is left to the 
candidate in the uncertain case. On the contrary, if r < q,  p  =  q  — t  in the case where 
the type of the candidate is known, which is larger than any bound that the candidate 
can achieve in the uncertain situation.
Comparative statics on the variability of the type, (x) Notice moreover that 
this is the same effect that can be observed if x increases when all the other parameters, 
r in particular, are kept fixed. In this case an increase in x affects both the two different 
solutions and the parametric regions in which they apply. In particular, a greater x 
reduces q — (r2 +  x2) 2 and increases 3g — 8^ g2 +  (r — x)2>j ; it as well increases q +  x 
moving some types r from having an optimal solution of 0  to an optimal solution 
of 3q — 8^ q2 +  (r — x)2^. The overall effect on 3q — (8q2 +  (r — x)2  ^ is interesting 
because it is related to the insurance effect that this part of the solution has: when 
this is the optimal level of discretion, the more extreme candidate will hit the bound
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significantly more often than the less extreme candidate; an increase in x , in this case, 
makes the insurance effect even stronger, because the moderate candidate moves closer 
to the median voter’s preferred policy, and the extreme candidate hits the bound more 
often.
Effects of changes in the expected type, (r) Let us now analyse the effect of a 
change in the expected type, while keeping the variability of the candidate’s type fixed. 
If candidate i?’s expected type increases from r to t '  > r, the level of discretion he 
can achieve is unambigously reduced. It is easy to see, in fact, that p x is a decreasing 
function of r.
1.3.4 A sym m etric candidates
To analyse the characteristics of the equilibrium when the candidates have different 
expected biases, or different level of uncertainty or both, let’s call Tj the expected 
bias of candidate j ,  and Xj his variability. We first consider the effects that a change 
in Tj or Xj has on the maximised value of the utility of the median voter. The 
following considerations can be easily drawn by looking at the partial derivative of 
the maximised function.
1 . the maximum expected utility is decreasing in the bias of the candidate;
2 . the maximum expected utility is decreasing in the variability of the type only
when |Tj| > ■ and q > Tj +  in any other parametric region the
maximum expected utility is increasing in the variability of the candidate’s type.
A sym m etric bias: consider candidates having x r  =  x r  and | t r |  <  \ t l \ ]  in this
case, as in the complete information case, the worse candidate is the one with the 
highest bias, that is candidate L, in our example. As a consequence, the median voter’s 
expected utility is determined in equilibrium by the characteristics of L, whereas R  
exploits his advantageous position to retain a greater discretion than he could if he 
was to face a symmetric candidate. Therefore the level of discretion in the system 
(weakly) increases.
Asym m etric variability: consider now what happens when |rft| = \ t l \  and x r  <
x l ] the crucial issue in this case is to understand who is the ‘worse’ candidate. Once 
the bad candidate is identified, the consequence on the equilibrium is that the candi­
date that is better from the median voter’s point of view wins the elections retaining 
for himself more discretion that he would have otherwise.
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1.4 E x-p ost ren egotia tion
So far we have considered a model in which the politicians commit to the promise they 
make. However, voters have complete information ex post about the realised state of 
the world.12 For any given promise that binds the right-wing candidate somewhere 
to the left of q (that is for any given set of promised policies that does not include 
all the possible realisations of the state of the world) it may happen that both the 
elected candidate and the median voter would prefer to deviate to a policy ir that is 
not in the set. It seems therefore plausible to assume that voters would not punish a 
candidate who deviates in this way. This section investigates the consequences of the 
possibility of renegotiation in the following way: first, as a benchmark, we consider 
what happens if the elected politician is constrained simply by the voters’ preferences; 
then we introduce limits to the possibility of renegotiation that depend on the set of 
promises ex ante.
1.4.1 Full renegotiation: a benchmark
When renegotiation takes place, the situation is asymmetric between the two types 
of agents: the appointed candidate is already in power, and the voters have to wait 
until the following election to be able to punish him. Moreover, the politician can 
at this point in time implement whatever policy he likes, and voters have no veto 
power. Given the reduced form nature of this model, where commitment on the set of 
promises is used to internalise the effects of the presence of future elections, I assume 
the following renegotiation procedure: the only way the candidate can deviate from 
his set of promised policies is to implement a policy that either leaves the median 
voter indifferent with his best alternative in the set of promised policies, or makes him 
better off. In a dynamic setting, this would be motivated by a desire to implement 
a policy that the median voter does not perceive as a negative deviation, so as not 
to be punished in the following election. The candidate, whose first objective is to 
be reelected, would minimise his disutility from deviating to a policy which is not his 
preferred one, under the constraint that this does not appear as a negative deviation to 
the median voter. As mentioned before, the model analysed here is a reduced form of 
such a strategic interaction, in which the voters who axe better off will not punish the 
candidate; therefore the renegotiation in this setting is a unilateral deviation which 
can be made only to a particular set of policies, in a way that mimics an implicit 
renegotiation between the candidate and the voters.
Given the unilateral nature of the renegotiation process, and the preferences of the 
voters, it is sufficient to leave the median voter indifferent between the original policy 
and the renegotiated one. To see this let 7r be the renegotiated policy and consider
12Remember that it is not possible in this setting to have state contingent promises; this can be 
justified for example with the complexity of communicating state contingent promises to the electorate. 
For a more complete discussion of why state contingent promises (or contracts) may not be a realistic 
assumption see Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1998, 1999).
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the case in which p  <  d  <  ir; if the median voter is indifferent between p  and 7r, all 
the voters with type U < 0 , that is all the voters to the left of the median voter, will 
be worse off, and all the voters to the right of the median voter, with type U > 0 , will 
be better off. The opposite reasoning applies if p  >  d  > 7r. The median voter will be 
pivotal in both cases; therefore I will focus uniquely on the effect that the change in 
policy has on the median voter.
How does the possibility of a renegotiation affect the final outcome? We have four 
possible cases:
~ p  > t r  + uj: in this case there is no scope for renegotiation because the politician is 
at his bliss point;
- d  <  p  <  t r  +  d \ in this case there is no scope for renegotiation either; in fact the
policy chosen without renegotiation is p :  the voter would like the politician to 
implement a smaller policy, while the politician would like to implement a larger 
one.
- p  <  d , and t r  >  d  — p :  in this case the renegotiation leaves the voter indifferent,
and increases the politician’s utility; the politician implements 2 d  — p ,  which 
makes him better off (given that under the above assumption t r  +  d  >  2 d  —  p ) , 
and leaves the voter with a disutility (d  — p ) 2 as before;
- p  <  d , and t r  < D —p : in this case, after the renegotiation the politician implements
t r  +  d , and the disutility for the voter is reduced to t 2r .
Notice that in many cases the ex-post renegotiation does not change the median 
voter’s disutility, but it simply improves the politician’s position. If the politician 
is right-wing this is true as long as u; < p  +  tr ; ifcj > p  -\- t r  the benefits from 
renegotiation reach the median voter as well.
Voters’ behaviour Given the above analysis of the effects of renegotiation, it is 
clear that the median voter’s expected disutility from candidate R  who promises [—q, 
p \  is the weighted average between the expected value of ( d  — p ) 2 , which is the median 
voter’s disutility when the state of the world assumes intermediate values, and t 2r  
which is the expected disutility when the state of the world is either very low, so that 
the candidate can implement directly his optimal point, or very high, so that he has 
all the freedom of renegotiating up to his optimal point. To maximise the median 
voter’s utility we choose:
min Pr(a; G (p -  TR , p  +  t r ] )E( ( d  -  p )2 \ d  G ( p ~ t r , p  +  t r \ )  
v
+ Pr(a; G ( ~ q , p  -  t r ]  U (p +  t r ,  q \)T 2R .
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Proposition 2  When q > t r  the median voter is indifferent between any set of 
promises characterised by p E  [ 0 ,  q — t r ] ;  when q < t r  the median voter’s disutility is 
minimised at p = 0 .
Since the voter is never worse off in this situation, he prefers the possibility of a 
renegotiation; moreover, given the renegotiation, he is indifferent between any policy 
bound that belongs to the interval [0,<7 — t r \ .  This is a consequence of the uniform 
distribution of u j . As shown in the figure below, the median voter’s disutility is 
bounded at t 2r  for all the values of uj outside [p — t r , p  + t r ] ;  inside this interval, the 
disutility of the median voter is (a; — p)2.
disutility
t 2Tn
\ / 
\  yi
P - t r  P p  +  t r  
Figure 5: Disutility with full renegotiation
Therefore any value of p such that p +  t r  < q is acceptable, because it lets the 
median voter fully profit from the reduced disutility that can be experienced in the 
interval \p - t r , p + t r ].  Notice that this is true only because in the uniform distribution 
the probability that uj lies in a specific interval is proportional to the length of the 
interval itself.
Effects of uncertainty. Let us now consider what happens if we introduce uncer­
tainty about the candidates’ types.
Proposition 3 When the politician’s type is either t — x  o t t + x  with equal probability, 
the median voter is indifferent between any set of promises of candidate R  with p 6  
[0, q — t r  — x] if q — t r  — x >  0; the median voter strictly perfers candidate R to 
promise p = 0  otherwise.
The effect of uncertainty over the candidate’s type is therefore to reduce the maxi­
mum ex-ante discretion that the candidate can retain for himself. The median voter is 
effectively targeting the optimal bound on the best type that the candidate can have.
Candidate’s behaviour Now let’s consider the elected candidate’s point of view. 
If q < t  the median voter has a strict preference for p = 0, and the candidate will 
comply with that. Therefore the question we need to answer is whether the candidate
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has some preference among the promises that are optimal from the median voter’s 
point of view when q >  t r .
From the candidate’s perspective, the best possible outcomes occur when the state 
is either very low or very high. If u  <  p ~ t r  the candidate implements his bliss point; 
if uj >  p +  t r  the renegotiation allows him to implement his optimal point. In both 
cases his disutility is 0 .
In the two intermediate regions he suffers a disutility from the distance between 
his preferred policy and the best he can implement. The expected disutility given p 
is therefore:
Pr (w €  (p -  t r , p ] )  E  ( { t r  +  u j - p ) 2 \ l j  e  { p -  T R ,p]^j  
+ Pr ( u ;  G  (p , p  +  t r ] ) E  ( { t r  - u  +  p ) 2 \ u  e  (.P , P  +  t r ] )
that is, in our region of interest, the objective function is:
mm „ 
p 2  q
\
[  T ^ v 2dhj +  2 ( TR - p )  f  ^ u x E j + ( p - t r ) 2 
Jp-TR Jp-TR[P+TR rP+TR
+ j  ^ L ) 2d u - 2 {t r  +  p ) J  ± u d j j  +  (p +  T R ) 2 j
ip j p
with the domain restriction that p  <  q — t r .
Proposition 4 When q >  t r  the right-wing politician  is indifferent between any se t 
of prom ises characterised by p  G  [0,g — t r \ .
Clearly this indifference result depends on the absence of any kind of attrition in 
the renegotiation process. However the full renegotiation can be taken as a benchmark 
to understand in which direction the limits to renegotiation change what is preferred 
by the median voter and the candidates, and what is effectively implemented.
Effects of uncertainty Candidates are also indifferent between any of the promises 
with p < q — t  — x\ in fact if the candidate’s type is t r  = t  + x, the candidate is 
indifferent between any p G  [0, q — t r ] ,  that is between any p G  [0, q  — t  — x]\ if the 
candidate’s type is r — x, the candidate is indifferent between any set of promises 
characterised by p G  [0, q — t  +  x], that is, in particular, between any p G  [0, q — r — x], 
given that the second set is included in the first one. Therefore an outcome where all 
candidates pool on the set of promises with |p| 6  [0 , q — r  — x] is sustainable as an 
equilibrium.
1.4.2 Limited renegotiation I: e-renegotiation
The previous analysis considered the two extreme cases: a situation in which there is 
no possible renegotiation after elections, and a situation in which the only constraint
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to renegotiation is that the median voter cannot be made worse off. It seems how­
ever plausible to assume that in the political arena renegotiation is possible, but the 
possibilities of renegotiation are somehow constrained.
The constraints to renegotiation can assume different shapes; the politician could 
not be able to implement extreme policies unless the voters explicitely expressed their 
opinion on them (i.e. unless the policies were included in the original platform); or 
the candidate could have costs from the change in policy that depend on the extent 
of the policy change.
The following analysis is focused on a particular limit to renegotiation: the can­
didate can renegotiate his policy only in an interval of length e outside the original 
promised set.
The effects of renegotiation on the final outcome are now as follows:
- p  >  t r  +  uj :  as before, there is no scope for renegotiation because the politician is
at his bliss point;
- u> < p  < t r + u :  again, there is no scope for renegotiation as in the full renegotiation
case;
- p  < u>, and (u j  — p )2 <  t 2r : in this case renegotiation leaves the voter indifferent,
and increases the politician’s utility; the politician would like to implement 
2 cj — p , which makes him better off (given that under the above assumption 
t r  + u  > 2 co — p ), and leaves the voter with a disutility ( c j  — p )2 as before; if 
2 cj — p  >  p  + e, the candidate implements p  +  e.
- p  < u>, and (uj  — p )2 >  t 2r \ in this case after the renegotiation the politician
implements min { t r  +  uj , p +  e:}, and the disutility for the voter is reduced to
min { rL  (P +  £ - ^ ) 2}-
Proposition 5 When the appointed po litic ian’s possib ilities o f renegotiation  are e- 
restricted, and t r  <  q, the m edian v o te r ’s preferred prom ise from  candidate R  is:
q - T R - e  i f  t r  < q — e
[0, q - TR]  if e > q  + T R  and q > T R
0  otherwise
Therefore increasing the possibility of renegotiation decreases the discretion that 
the candidate can retain ex ante; from the voters’ point of view a larger e is associated 
to a greater possibility of renegotiating ex post to a more extreme policy, and therefore 
an increase in e is associated to a lower level of discretion ex-ante. This happens up 
to the point in which the limit to renegotiation is no longer binding, and the set of 
optimal promises converges to the unlimited renegotiation one.
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Optimal lim its to renegotiation (e) Suppose now that the median voter could 
target the limits to renegotiation exactly on the candidates’ bias. What would be the 
optimal e  given, for example, that the right-wing candidate has tipe t r ?  It can be 
shown that
otherwise
where j  is the elected candidate. Notice that a larger e has two effects: it reduces 
the ex-ante promised policies, and it increases the extent of ex-post renegotiation. 
Notice moreover that this does not affect the most extreme implemented policy that 
is anyway q — |ry| in absolute value and is decreasing in \ t j \ .
1.4.3 Limited renegotiation II: convex costs
The above example of limited renegotiation can be thought as a case in which there 
are convex costs of renegotiation, where the costs are equal to zero if the renegotiated 
policy is less than e away from the set of promises, and equal to infinity otherwise. 
Let’s now consider a more general class of convex costs of renegotiation, where the 
cost of renegotiation is 7 (p* — 7r)2, 7  > 0, where p* is the bound of the candidate’s set 
of promises, and 7r is the renegotiated policy.
C andidate’s optim al behaviour ex post Notice that the optimal renegotiated 
policy from candidate .ft’s point of view is 7r that minimizes:
( t r  +  uj -  7r) 2 +  7(7r -  p*)2
that is 7T =  TR+^ ^ P st, given p < t r  +  u j . The candidate’s optimal behaviour ex post 
is therefore the following, given the possibility of renegotiation and its costs:
- p* > t r  + u j : the candidate implements tt =  t r  +  uj \
- uj < p* < t r  +  uj : the chosen policy is 7r = p*, given that the interests of the
candidate and the median voter are not aligned;
- p* < uj and uj — p* < the implemented policy is tt = 2u> — p, because the
median voter’s indifference condition is binding;
- p* < uj and uj —p* > , the implemented policy is 7r =  TR+^ y'yp
M edian voter’s preferred set We need to compute the new optimal bound to 
the candidate’s set of promises. If candidate ft is elected the median voter’s expected 
utility is:
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E  -  p f  |  u  e  p  — r R , p +  1  +  2 7
+ P r ( u j  e  [ - q , p - r R ) ) T 2R ,
which is optimized at
0  otherwise.
Notice that the bound is decreasing in the candidate’s bias, as it was always 
the case in the previous specifications of the model. There are however other more 
interesting effects:
• the bound is increasing in the weight of the renegotiation costs in the candidates’ 
utility function 7 ; the more the candidates will find difficult to renegotiate their 
policy ex post, the more the median voter is ex ante willing to give them discre­
tion;
dp*• as it can be seen studying the sign of the ex post implemented policy is 
under some parametric conditions increasing in the candidate’s bias; this is in­
teresting because it reflects an inutitive characteristic of policy implementation, 
that is that more extreme candidates implement more extreme policies. This is 
combined however with the fact that more extreme candidates need to specify 
their electoral agenda much more in detail to have a chance of being elected 
given that they need to convince the less extreme voters as well. In fact, given 
their bias, they are forced to have a smaller set of promises; this implies that 
the renegotiation is more frequent, and that its extent is larger.
This last effect works despite the fact that the voters anticipate that the more 
biased candidate will renegotiate to extreme policies ex post.
1.4.4 Considerations on renegotiation in elections
The process described above is essentially characterised by an asymmetric distribution 
of power between the candidate and the median voter. It is interesting however to 
analyse more in detail what this implies for the whole set of voters, and for the freedom 
that the candidate has in choosing the policy.
Gains from renegotiation In order to develop a better understanding of the rene­
gotiation process described above, and of the reasons for which it is natural to fo­
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cus the attention on the median voter’s choice, it is interesting to understand who 
gains and loses in the process. Assume that candidate R  is elected after he promised 
P  { t r )  = [—q,P r \]  consider now the case in which the state of the world is u) > p r , 
and the candidate renegotiates his promises by implementing the policy 2 cj — p r . It 
was argued before that this renegotiation leaves the median voter indifferent; what 
happens to all the other voters? The voters who gain from this renegotiation are those 
with a positive bias with respect to the median voter; this means that the right-wing 
candidate is effectively renegotiating his promises by setting a policy which favours 
his electorate and displeases his opponent’s electorate. This behaviour grants him 
the future approval of his own electorate, in a way that makes the median voter the 
decisive one in future elections as well.
D iscretion and renegotiation There is an important feature of renegotiation that 
it is notable. In the first part of the paper, where renegotiation was not a possibility, 
a candidate had more discretion the larger was the set of promises; in a model where 
renegotiation is possible, discretion comes to the candidate from two different sources: 
if the set of promises is large, the candidate has discretion in the choice of a policy from 
the set, while if the set is small, the candidate will more often be able to renegotiate 
his promises. This is a consequence of the fact that the smaller is the set of promises 
the more it is probable that both the candidate and the median voter will dislike the 
outcome that will be possible by choosing a policy among the promised ones.
R enegotiation and uncertainty When renegotiation is allowed after the election 
has taken place, an increase in the uncertainty over the candidates’ types reduces the 
space of the optimal set of promises. In fact, if we consider for example candidate 
R , the set of promises is optimally bounded by p € [0 , q — r  — x]; clearly the largest 
possible bound is decreasing in the level of uncertainty x. However this does not 
predict that increasing uncertainty will reduce the effective level of discretion in the 
campaign, because it does not say anything about which of the possible bounds is 
chosen as a function of x. It may as well be that the equilibrium bound is increasing 
or decreasing in x.
Im portance of information In these models the voters know u  as soon as it is 
realised. It may be interesting to understand how the renegotiation process differs 
when the voters are only provided with coarse information on the state of the world. 
This may be a sensible assumption for example when u  is interpreted as the state 
of the economy. This extension of the model, however, can be analysed only in the 
extensive form of the dynamic setting.
Extrem e politicians In the general case of convex costs, we can notice that it 
allows for a case of comparative statics that it is perceived to be intuitive: there are
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parametric values in which a more extreme candidate will ex post implement more 
extreme policies than a less biased one, despite being more constrained ex ante. The 
effect of an increase in \rj\ over the final implemented policy is threefold:
• it reduces the set of promised policies: the voters allow less discretion ex ante 
to an extreme candidate;
• it increases the possibility of renegotiation ex post: given that the set of promises 
is smaller, it happens more frequently that the state of the world u  is such that 
renegotiation is possible;
• it changes the desired policy that the politician wants to implement ex post: 
given the existence of renegotiation costs that depend on the distance between 
the set of promises and the implemented policy the direction of this effect is 
not clear. A more extreme candidate has more incentive to move closer to what 
he perceives as optimal policy; however, he is in general also more distant from 
it, given that his set of promises is smaller. Therefore the effect on the desired 
policy ex post depends on the importance of the renegotiation costs.
When the renegotiation costs are low ( 7  small) the ex post implemented policy 
is increasing with the candidate’s bias. Therefore we have that more extreme can­
didates make more restrictive promises in order to be elected, but also they end up 
implementing more extreme policies ex post. The mechanism is very interesting: ex­
treme candidates find necessary to restrain their set of promises more than moderate 
candidates to be elected; as a consequence of the smaller set of promises it is more 
often the case that they can appeal to the circumstances (that is to a realisation of 
u j  which is fax away from the set of promises) and induce an ex post implemented 
policy that is increasingly far away from the median voter’s optimal policy, the more 
extreme the candidate is. Notice that this is an equilibrium phenomenon that is fully 
anticipated by the voters, and it is not due to any fooling process that the candidates 
may try, given that the information on the candidates’ types is complete. This result 
seems consistent with what we observe in reality, that is often more extreme policies 
are implemented by extreme candidates.
1.5 C onclusions
This paper analyses an electoral contest as a competitive delegation problem. The 
aim of the paper is to investigate, with a simple model, what axe the chaxacteristics 
of an election that favor the politicians’ vagueness, for example the structure of the 
electoral system, or the nature of the candidates.
I show that the level of ambiguity of the electoral campaign is determined by two 
different factors. The first one is related to the the median voter’s willingness to del­
egate, at least partially, policy decisions to an informed candidate, despite his bias.
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However, this factor only accounts for part of the discretion that the candidates are 
able to retain for themselves. Candidates are able to increase their freedom through 
electoral competition, when their preferred policies are not symmetric. The candi­
dates’ discretion depends negatively on their own bias with respect to the median 
voter’s preferred policy.
The interaction between the median voter’s preferences and the candidates’ ones is 
analysed both in the case of complete information and in the case of private informa­
tion on the candidates’ preferred policies. In the first case it is relevant to notice that 
in most cases the welfare of the electorate depends uniquely on the characteristics of 
the more extreme candidate; the moderate candidates’ characteristics are important 
only when the type of the bad candidate is really extreme. In the latter case, an 
increase in the uncertainty about the candidates can increase or decrease the level 
of ambiguity of the system. Ambiguous promises have in fact a different effect on 
moderate and extreme candidates; they bind extreme candidates more often, thus 
providing some insurance for the median voter. This effect is more relevant when the 
candidate’s expected type is extreme; if this is the case, an increase in the uncertainty 
about the candidate’s type increases the likelihood that he is a less biased type, and 
the willingness of the median voter to give him discretion about the future policies, 
without worries about the more biased type, given the insurance effect of the promises.
The last part of the paper relaxes the assumption of commitment on the promised 
sets of policies, and considers a case in which the elected candidate can renegotiate 
his promises after he has observed the state of the world. One interesting feature of 
renegotiation in this setting is that it changes our perspective of what is ambiguous 
and what is not. A general promise, in fact, allows the candidate to choose among a 
large set of policies ex post; a very specific promise, on the other hand, allows him 
to renegotiate his promises in a larger number of cases, increasing his discretion once 
elected. This effect is even more relevant in the case in which we impose limits on the 
renegotiation process; when this happens, we observe that relaxing the constraints on 
renegotiation reduces the discretion that the candidate can retain ex-ante.
I moreover analyse the consequences of different limits to renegotiation. By doing 
this I obtain that convex costs to renegotiation may generate a very interesting con­
sideration on extreme politicians: in general extreme politicians are the ones that are 
more limited in their ex ante set of promises, given their need to reassure the median 
voter that they will not implement policies that are too far away from the median 
voter’s optimal one. However, under convex costs of renegotiation it may be the case 
that ex post more bias candidate are indeed the ones that implement more extreme 
policies, which seems an intuitive result.
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A  A p p en d ix
A .l  Proof of Proposition 1
As mentioned in Section 2 , the proof is composed of two steps; in the first one it is shown that the 
optimal set of promises will be an interval of the shape P( t r ) =  [—q,PR.] and P ( t l ) =  [pl, q], and in 
the second step the optimal pr  and pl are derived.
Step 1: P ( t r ) — [—q,PR]  and P ( t l ) — [pz,,<?]• Let’s prove the result for candidate R. 
Consider first the fact that, being P  a closed set and a subset of 3ft, P  is the finite union of closed 
intervals and points. Assume now that policy pr  is optimally included in the set of promises, and 
let’s show that if p is included in the optimal promise set, then any point smaller than p  must be 
included too. To do so, we first show that the optimal promise has to be an interval, that is, that the 
set of promises cannot contain any hole. Suppose there is an interval (a, b) < p  which is not included 
in the promise. Then the candidate will ex post choose a for r  +  u  <  and b otherwise. His 
best response is therefore upper hemicontinuous. This is a mean preserving spread compared to the 
situation in which the interval belongs to P(t)  and the candidate chooses t + u  whenever t + u  £  (a, b). 
Since the median voter is risk averse, his utility is lower with the mean preserving spread; the same 
reasoning can be extended to P  being an interval and a point, and a finite collection of points. The 
optimal set of promises is therefore an interval. Let now p  be the lower bound of this interval and 
consider a policy x <  p. If x  is not in the set of promises, the candidate will choose p  whenever the 
state of the world is smaller than p — r; when x is made available, the candidate will choose it when 
u  <  |  (p +  x) — r, and he will implement p when u £ [ |  (p +  x) — r , p  — t ]  . In the last case the 
expected disutility of the median voter for states to < p — r  in the case in which |  (p +  x) — r  >  — q 
is:
Pr (w < p -  t) \  \
+  X
- T , p - T
which becomes:
p - r  +  q
fR~T 2 f LTL~T fE-7
J  to dto — 2xJ todu — 2p
<yP — X 9 t y
todu +  p =— \- x 1 ~
p ^
{P + X , \
the above disutility is smaller than the expected disutility over states smaller than p — r  when x is 
not available:
E {{u -  p)2 \ u  < p -  t ) =
1 ‘
p - r  +  q
in fact the difference between the two function is
{ j p - x )
/ P-T fR~Tu du — 2p udu +  (p — r  +  q)p
~q J —q
f p  +  x \
p - r  +  q
which is negative given that — t +  q >  0 by assumption. The median voter disutility is the same 
for states that are greater than the threshold because the policy that the candidate implements ex 
post is the same. Finally we can notice that including x in the set of promises does not make any 
difference when  ^ (p +  x) — r  < — q given that x will never be chosen. Combining all these observation 
we can conclude that there is a continuum of sets that are optimal for candidate R: P ( t r )  =  (p,P r ] ,  
with p £ (—oo, —q +  r]. We choose p  =  —q, linking the promised set to the true possible realizations
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of the state of the world. Notice that in this way the set of promises is closed and bounded.
The result for candidate L is proved analogously.
S t e p  2: t h e  o p t im a l  P a  a n d  P l . Let’s assume that candidate R  will make a promise 
P { t r )  =  [—q,pR.\, and candidate L a promise P ( t l ) =  \pL,q\- Their sets of promises are now fully 
described by their bounds pl and p r . The optimal behaviour of the median voter is to vote for the 
candidate with a promise and a type such that £ ,t/m(rj,P (rJ)) is the highest between the available 
candidates.
Let’s focus again on candidate R. The median voter’s expected disutility when the candidate 
type is t r ,  u> ^  U [~q,q], and P ( t r ) =  [~q,PR\ is:
Pr(r« +  u >  pR)E((u -  pR)2 | t r  +  w >  p R) +  Pt(tr  +  u  < P r ) t r
For a given ideology of candidate R, the problem is now to compute the optimal promise to please 
the median voter, that is, to minimise his expected disutility. The problem is therefore:
min P t ( t r  +  u> >  pR) [E(u2 \ t r  +  u  > p r )  -  2pRE(u  | t r  +  to >  pR) +  p2R] +  Pr(r« +  u <  P r ) t r
PR
where Pt(tr  +  uj > p r )  =  q~p%*TR and P t(tr  +  uj < p r )  =  g+pf ~ TR-
The objective function includes the probability that t r  +  uj >  p r ,  and the complementary prob­
ability. Since the two probabilities must be bounded between zero and one, the objective function is 
a piecewise function defined over three intervals: when p r  < t r  — q, P t ( t r  +  u> >  p r )  =  1 and the 
objective function is E(u  — p r ) 2 \ when p r  >  t r  +  q, P t ( t r  +  u  < p r )  =  1, and the objective function 
is Tr  ; for intermediate values both probabilities are between zero and one.
Summarizing, the median voter’s problem is:
E( u2) +  p2R if pR< T R - q
mm
p
9 P2 q TR {E(uj2 I t r  +  CJ >  p r )  -  2 p r E ( u i  I t r  +  u  >  p r )  +  P r )  i f  p r E  [ t r  - q , T R  +  q]
2 g
2 g
| Q+PR-tr  2 
I ' Ft
„ T r  if PR> T R + q
which, expanding and substituting for the expected values13, becomes:
4 +PR if PR<TR - q
mm
p
{ i  ~  ^  ^  ~PRt R + P r TR +  4  -  ^  +PRTr )  if Pr €[ t r - q,TR +  q]
2g RR ' 2g
_2„ Tr if PR> TR +  q
The following subsection discusses in detail the minimisation of this function, studying its be­
13 The expected values in question are:
.  E( u 2) =  I** u 2- j^du — ;
J-g
.  £ ( a , 2 | r B  +  w > M )  =  f  =  , - r l + r R
j PR-tr
•  E(u 2 \ t r  +  u > p r ) =  f  u - — ± - - d w  =  ^
JPR-TR -PR+tr
g -(PR—rR)
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haviour in every region and analysing the properties of the global minimum.
As discussed above, the objective function relative to candidate R  is defined over the three different 
intervals represented in the following figure:
------------------------------------------1------------------ 1 > P
T R ~ q  T R  +  q
Figure 6 : Intervals in the complete information case
Region 1: p r  < t r  — q. The first thing to notice is that this region belongs to the space of the 
parameter p r  only when t r  > q. In this region the objective function is defined as:
E ( u 2) + P r  — J — uj2dw +  P r  —  +  P r
The minimum of the objective function in this region is therefore reached where 2pr  =  0, 
which implies pr  =  0. The second order condition for a minimum is satisfied since 2 >  0. The
Region 2: p r  € [ t r  — q, t r  +  q\ . In this region the objective function is:
q P r  +  t r  | T r  _|_ w  >  p R j  _  2 P r e ( u }  | t r + u  >  p r )  +  p 2R )
2 q
The first order condition is:
, q +  PR - t r _ 2 
+   Tfi
( —p i t  — Q2  +  2 p j t g  +  t r )  — 0
Therefore the two possible solutions are p r  =  q +  t r ,  and p r  =  q — t r ,  which both belongs
to the interval, provided that q >  t r .  The second order condition for a minimum states
that —2p r  +  2q >  0, which implies pR < q. Therefore the solution in this region is p r  =
min{0, q — t r } ,  and the value of the function at the minimum 1s t 2  — | y ,  whenever t r  <  q,
2
and it is bounded above at when t r  >  q.
•  Region 3: P r  >  t r  +  q. This region is relevant only when t r  +  q <  1. In this region the 
objective function is t 2r , which is independent of pR. So any promise pR >  t r  +  q is equivalent 
from the median voter point of view, and delivers disutility t 2r .
It is possible to see that a promise in region 3 is never optimal from the median voter’s point 
of view, because for every t r  it delivers t r , while the value of the objective function in region 2 is 
min | t 2 r — f V} < r fl- The overall solution, therefore is the following:
.  _  j  q ~  t R if t r  < q  
1 0  otherwise
which implies that the median voter has disutility min j-
In a similar way, the solution of the analogous problem referred to candidate L yields to the 
following optimal promise:
q +  T L  if \ t l  I <  q
^L ' 0 otherwise
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The optimal set of promises will therefore be P (t r ) =  [—q,p*R,\, and P {tl) =  [pl>9] where p*R and 
p*L are the bounds defined above. ■
A . 2  M i n im is a t io n  in  t h e  u n c e r t a in t y  c a s e ,  q >  x .
Remember that the function we want to minimise, in the case in which q >  x, is:
4 + P f l  if p r < t — x — q
l_ |~q - P f l - 2 ( r - x )  _  p R ( j2  +  p 2R q  +  q  ( T  _  +  p R  ^ T  _  x ^2 j  p R ^  [T  _  x  _  Q }T  +  x  _  q j
+  1 [V  + p r \
 + p2Rq + q (T _ xj2 + pR ^  _ x 2^j if PrE [T + x _ qtT_ x + qj
+  1_ |~q - P f l - 2 ( r + x )  _  p R q 2  +  p 2R(J +  g  ^  +  ^ 2  +  p R  ^  +
JL | q - p f l - 2 ( r + x )  pRq2 +  ^  +  q ^  +  ^ 2  +  pR ^  + j f  pR& [ t  X T  g,  T  X q\
+  1  [ ( t - x ) 2 ]
|  [(r -  x )2] +  \  [(r +  x)2] if p r > t +  x +  q
subject to pr  £ [0,1] and remember also that given our definition of the types, we have the implicit
assumption that r  >  x. In order to minimise the median voter’s expected disutility, we need to study 
the behaviour of the function in every region.
The objective function is a piecewise function defined over the following intervals:
R e g io n  1: p  <  T — x  — q. The objective function in this region is ^- +  p2, therefore, as we 
show in the case where the type is known, the optimal promise from the median voter’s point of view 
is p =  0.
R e g io n  2: p  €  [r — X — Q ,r +  X — q] . In this case the objective function that the median 
voter wants to minimise is:
q3 p3 2 , \ 3  2 . „2 „ . /_ \ 2 , /_ \2 . 1 q~ | 21_
4 q
therefore the first order condition is
y - y - - ( r - x )  - p q  + p  q +  q ( r  -  x) +  p ( r - x ) 1+  2
,2
—p 2 — q2 +  t 2  +  x 2  —  2 t x  +  6pq —  0 ,  
which gives us the following candidates for the solution:
p =  3g ±  (8g2 +  (r -  x )2) 2 .
The second order condition says that this is a minimum provided that —2p  +  6g >  0, that 
is provided that p <  3q. Therefore the only candidate to be a minimum in this region is p =  
3q -  (8q2 +  (r -  x )2) 2 ; we need to check if 3q — (8q2 +  (r — x)2) 2 £ [t — x — q , r  +  x — q].
•  3q — (8q2 +  (r — x )2) 1 > t  — x  —q whenever 4q — ( t  — x )  > (8 q2 +  ( t  -  x)2) 2 . If t  — x  <  4q the 
inequality is never satisfied. If r  — x <  4g both sides are positive, so the inequality holds if and 
only if (4g — (r — x ) ) 2 >  8q2 +  (r — x )2, that is iff 16g2 +  (r — x )2 — 8 g (r — x) >  8 q2 +  (r — x )2. 
The inequality reduces to 8 q(q — r +  x) >  0, which is satisfied when r < q +  x.
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•  3g — (8q2 +  (r — x)2) 3 < r +  x — g whenever 4q — t  — x <  (8 g2 +  (r — x)2) 3 . If r  +  x <  4g
the inequality is always satisfied, because the left handside is negative and the right one is
positive. If r  +  x >  4g the inequality holds if and only if 16g2 +  r 2 +  x 2 +  2rx — 8 qr  — 8 qx <  
8g2 +  t 2 +  x 2 +  2rx, that is, iff 8g2 +  4rx — 8 q(r  +  x) < 0. The inequality is satisfied when 
r > 292 q l ^  • Notice that 2q2 < 4q — x,  which implies that the inequality is satisfied for 
every r.
This implies that whenever t  < q +  x, the minimum of the objective function in this region is 
attained at p =  3g — (8 q2 +  (r — x )2), while when r  >  g +  x, the minimum is attained at p =  t — x — q.
The expected disutility at 3q — (8q2 +  (r — x ) 2) 3 is:
-5 0 g 3 +  18g2(8g2 +  (r -  x ) 2) 5 -  2q(r -  x ) 2 -  | ( r  -  x ) 3 .
4g
R e g io n  3: p  £  [t  x  — q , T  — X q] . In this region the objective is to minimise:
\  [ i  ( 4  “  i  ~  I (T “  x )3 “  P?2 +  P29 +  9 (r -  x)2 +  p (r -  x)2) l  
+  1 [ i  - | ( r  +  x)3 - p g 2 + p 2g +  g (r  +  x)2 + p ( r  +  x)2j ]  .
The first order condition is —p2 — g2 +  2pq +  r 2 +  x2 = 0 ,  therefore the possible solutions are 
p =  q ±  ( t 2 +  x2) 3 . The second order condition for a minimum requires —2p +  2q >  0, that is p <  q, 
hence the solution in this region is p =  q — (r2 +  x 2) 3 , which belongs to [r +  x — g, r  — x +  g] when 
T <  2<2 qlx^ an(  ^ T < 2 q  — x 2 .
The expected disutility at p =  q — (r2 +  x2) 3 is
l T * ■ x 2 2 1 ( t 2 + x 2) 2 rx 2
3 g 3 g g
Region 4: p G [t  — a; +  T +  X  +  q] . In this region the objective is to minimise
2g V 3 3 3
(r +  x )3 -  pq2 +  p2g +  g (r +  x ) 2 +  p (r +  x )“
The first order condition is: —p2 — q2 +  2pq +  r 2 +  x2 +  2rx =  0, implying that the possible solutions 
are p  =  q ±  (r +  x). The second order condition imposes that p < g, so the only candidate for a local 
minimum is g — (r +  x), while g +  r  +  x is a local maximum. However g — (r +  x) does not belong 
to this region. Therefore the minimum in this region is attained at r — x +  g14, where the expected 
disutility is:
lx_3
3  q
- X — + T 2 + X 2.
Region 5: P  >  T  +  X +  q. In this region the objective function is \  [(r — x)2] +  |  [(r +  x )2] 
which does not depend on p. Any p in the region is equivalent to the median voter and gives expected 
disutility \  [(r — x)2] +  |  [(r +  x)2] =  r 2 +  x2.
Overall solution.
1. Solutions in region 4 and 5 are never global optima: a solution in region 5 is always dominated 
by a solution in region 4;
14Over the interval [r — x +  g, r  +  x +  g] the function in question is concave, with is local maximum 
at r  +  x +  g. Therefore the local minimum is at the other extreme of the interval.
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2. Whenever r >  q +  x the solution is p =  0, because all the other solutions collapse to p =  0;
3. When <  r  < q +  x the minimum is at 3q — (8 g2 +  ( t  — x)2), because region 1 is not
relevant (r — x — q < 0) and the solution in region 3 belongs to region 2 as well (we know by
the optimisation in region 2 that 3q — (8q2 +  (r — x)2) is better than r  +  x — q.
4. When r  <  -^Z^ the minimum is at q — (r2 +  x2) 5 because the solution in region 2 collapses
to t  +  x — q which is also a solution in region 3.
All this taken into account, the solution has the following shape:
P r  =
2\ 5 if r  <  Ha(az*i
—  2 q —xq -  (r2 +  x2)
3q -  (8q2 +  { t  -  x)2) if r  g [ 2ffiTgX*. g +  s] 
0  otherwise.
A .3 Proof of proposition 2
Proof: Let’s start considering the case in which q > t r .  Taking into account that p >  0, and that 
u> £ [—q,q], when q >  t r  the objective function becomes:
Of P + T R  f P + T R  \27*U}2d u - 2 p [  ^ u d w + p 2 ) +  q~2qTRT2R if p < q - T RP - T R  J p - T R  /
( f  1 ^ W R u 2d x J - 2 p f  - ± - u d w + p 2 )  + 3 ± ^ t 2r  i f  p > q - T R
\ J p - T R  J  p  T  R  /
min
p 9-p+tr
2 q
which can be simplified to become:
i  —  S V  i t p < q - T R
min S i f  Q3— P3— 2tr 2 , 2 , 2 ,  ^ ’p I ( — 3— K ~ p q  + p t r + p  q  +  q t )  if p > q - T R
therefore the median voter is indifferent between any set of promises characterized by p < q — t r ,
2  r 3
given that does not depend on p. Moreover, the minimum of the function in the second interval 
is attained at p — q — r^where the disutility is the same as in the first interval, given the continuity 
of the function.15
Let us now consider the case in which q <  t r ;  in this case p >  q — t r  always, and the median 
voter’s problem is:
■ h t* >■ si. f  [ q 1  2  j  n  f q 1  j  , t q  +  P - T R  2m m  z  /  uidu) — 2 p l  -------------- 1udu+p  I H--------   t r
\ J p - T R  q - P  +  T R  J  q - p  +  T R  J  2 q
. q - p  +  T R  .nn -— £—
p 2? v -tr'
which can be rewritten as:
mm „ 
p 2 q
1 f q 3 - p 3 - 2 T 3R  2 2 . 2
 3------------ n
and the only solution is p  =  0 16
15The first order condition is — p2 — q2 +  T r  +  2pq =  0, which gives as possible solutions p =  q ±  t r ; 
looking at the second order condition it is clear that p =  q — t r  is the minimum.
16The unconstrained minimum is at p =  q — t r  <  0; given that p >  0, the minimum in the domain 
is at p  =  0 .
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A .4 Proof of proposition 3
Proof: Consider candidate fl.The objective function in this case is an average between the expected 
disutility with renegotiation when the type is r  +  x, and when the type is r — x, as follows:
Clearly the median voter is indifferent between any set of promises characterised by p < q — t  — x,
attained at p =  q — r  +  x. Therefore the overall minimum, given the continuity of the function is for 
any p G [0, q — r  — x].B
A .5 Proof of proposition 4
Proof: The objective function described above can be rewritten as follows:
of parametric values in which q >  t r  and p  < q — T R ,  and the candidate is as well indifferent between 
any set of promises characterised by p  G [0, q — t r ] .  ■
A .6 Proof of proposition 5
Let’s consider first the case in which q >  r  >  | .  In this case min {2u — p,p +  £} =  2u — piiu> < p + §, 
and min { t  +  u ,p  +  e} =  p +  e always. Therefore the objective function becomes:
( t —x)3 +  ( r + x ) 3 39 if p  <  q—r  — x
i_ ( 93 - P 3 - 2 ( t - x ) 3 _ 
*9 V 3
I _1_ (  93 — P3 — 2 ( t + x ) 3 
49 I 3
if p  G [q — r  — x,q — t +  x]
pq2 + p ( r  — x)2 +  p2qj  if p >  q—T +  x 
-  pq2 +  p  (r +  x)2 +  p2q)
given that the objective function does not depend on p  in that region. In the interval where p  G 
[q — r  — x, q — t +  x] the minimum is attained at p =  q — r  — x;17 in the third region the minimum is
min
3
which, simplifying becomes Therefore the objective function does not depend on p , for the range
mi nPr(wG ( p ~ t r , P +  I ) )  E  ((w - p ) 2 \ u e  (P - t k , p + ! ) )  
+  P r ( u  G  ( p +  | , q r ) )  E  ( ( u )  -  p  -  e ) 2  \ u  G  ( p  +  | , g ) )
+  Pr(w G (- q , P ~ T R))T2R
When p <  q — § the objective function is
The first order condition therefore is:
- p 2 +  2p (q -  e) -  (q2 +  e2 -  2 eq -  r 2) =  0
which gives as possible solutions q — e ±  r. The second order condition reveals the solution to be 
q — e — t .
17The first order condition implies that the possible candidates are p =  q ± ( r  +  x),  and the second 
order condition indicates that the minimum is attained at p  =  q — t — x.
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When p >  q — § the objective function is:
min Pr (u E (jp — t r ,  q)) E  ((u -  p)2 | u> E (p -  t r ,  <?))
p
+  Pr(w e  ( - q , p - T R) ) r 2R
which becomes
2 q
q  - p  - 2 t r  2 , 2  , 2 , 2
-  -  p q  + p  q  +  q-rR  +  p t r3
The first order and second order condition would place the minimum at q — t r  which is outside the
range, therefore the minimum is at the lower bound of the interval, where p  =  q — §. We can therefore
conclude that the minimum is at p =  q — t r  — e, when p  >  0 , and p  =  0 otherwise.
Let’s now consider the case in which t r  < !■ In this case min {2u — p,p +  e} =  p +  e always, 
and min { t r  +  u),p +  e) =  t r  + u  when u <  p  +  e — t r .  Therefore the objective function is:
min Pr (w 6 (p -  t r ,  p  +  t r ) )  E  ( ( u ;  -  p ) 2 \ to G ( p  -  t r ,  p  +  t r ) )  
p
+  Pr (w £ (jp +  e -  t, q)) E  ((u> -  p  -  e)2 \ u  6  ip +  £ -  t, q))
+  Pr (u> G ( ~ q , p  ~  t r )  U (p +  T R , p  +  e -  t ) ) T 2R .
If p >  q — e +  T R  the objective function is the same one described in proposition 2, and the median 
voter is indifferent between any set of promises [max {0, q — e +  t }  , q — t r ] .  If p <  q — e +  T R  the 
objective function becomes
1_ 
2 q 3
The first order condition is
q (p +_e)_ _  2 t 3j _  ^  +  ^  q2 +  ^  +  £ 2^ ? +  +  +  £t 2r
- ( p  +  e)2 - q 2 +  2 (p +  e)q + t 2r  =  0
which gives as a solution p =  q — t r  — e. Therefore the solution is p =  q — t r  — e as long as this is 
greater than zero, p  =  0 when e G  [q — t r ,  q +  t r ] ,  and any p E [0, q — t r ]  if e > q +  t r .
A .7 Optimal e
Assume that R  is the elected candidate. The median voter’s expected loss given p =  q — t r  — e is:
this is the median voter’s expected loss when t r  <  q —  e. The first order condition gives e* —  t r  
Notice that this is a solution for t r  <
If t r  > g — e the relevant function becomes:
1 /  2 2 . 2 . q3 2 3 1
T R - e q  + c  g + - - - T R j
where the first order condition gives e =  f . The result for j  =  L can be proved analogously.
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2 Last m inute policies and the
2.1 In trodu ction
In political debates and election campaigns, politicians always face an important trade­
off. On the one hand, talcing an early and firm stand on a particular topic signals 
competence and vision, creates media presence, and allows to actively shape the course 
of the debate. On the other hand, later positioning has the advantage that more 
information is available both on the topic and on the stand of political competitors. 
Hence, decisions can potentially be better for the politician and for the society as a 
whole.
This trade-off can be illustrated by the German federal election in 2002. Amidst 
economic problems of unemployment and recession, the incumbent coalition of Social- 
Democrats and Greens was a clear second in polls behind the conservative opposition. 
While the campaign had understandably focused on issues of domestic economic policy, 
with 85% of Germans seeing unemployment as the single most important problem in 
the country, the “party council of [chancellor] Schroeder’s Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) decided on 1 August to begin the final phase of the re-election campaign earlier 
than planned.” (Fiirtig, 2007, p. 315) After the meeting, Schroder publicly announced 
that there axe “alarming news from the Middle East” (p. 316) and made clear that 
Germany would not participate under any circumstances militarily or financially in 
disarming Iraq. Thus, the German government put the Iraq issue on the political 
agenda and took a strong position that most of the German voters agreed on. They did 
so although it was very uncertain that a war would ever be fought and German support 
ever requested from the US. In addition, this move nullified Schroder’s agreement with 
US President George W. Bush to put the Iraq situation on the agenda only after the 
election, so that a pro-American stance would not harm the incumbent coalition. 
Consequently, the perceived importance of the Iraq conflict jumped from 6th to 2nd 
rank within one month. In the September elections, the incumbent coalition was 
confirmed.
This example shows vividly the trade-off in the timing of political statements 
which we model in this paper. To capture facets of the trade-off, we will consider an 
environment of agenda formation in which candidates are competent -  or well-informed 
-  on one particular topic and compete in competencies, not in ideologies (Petrocik, 
1996). While a political statement indicates a proposed policy of a candidate on a 
particular topic, the timing of messages allows voters to infer about the relevance 
of the issue for society. We model the electoral incentives by assuming that voters
18This chapter draws on work that was carried out jointly with equal share by Stefan P. Penczynski
incumbent 18
and me.
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follow a simple behavioural rule. Each voter i cares only about one of the issues 
and votes only when the probability that his preferred issue is relevant for the future 
government period is greater than a cutoff. Since different voters have different cutoffs, 
the probability of relevance affects the participation of voters.
We investigate under what circumstances an incumbent has any incentive to lead 
the policy debate towards a certain issue. We find that the quality of information 
affects the choice of the incumbent in two ways. First, the incumbent has a natural 
tendency towards influencing the electoral debate in a way that stresses the importance 
of the issue on which he is better at (effect of the relative advantage). Second, trying to 
influence the debate induces the incumbent to reveal his strategic position earlier, and 
allows the challenger to respond optimally; as a consequence, if the information on the 
relatively better issue is very precise, the incumbent may decide not to influence the 
debate, in order not to lose his strategic advantage on the issue (effect of the absolute 
advantage).
Section 2.2 presents the relevant literature related to our model. Section 2.3 in­
troduces the general features of the model. The analysis of the equilibria is contained 
in section 2.4 and 2.5, treating the simultaneous and sequential cases, respectively. 
Section 2.7 analyses the situation of information asymmetries between voters and 
candidates regarding the competencies. Section 2.9 contains the welfare analysis and 
section 2.11 the discussion of the model and possible extensions. Section 2.12 con­
cludes.
2.2 L iterature
Political science has a long tradition of considering agenda setting in the context of 
political elections and the formation of public opinion. Lippmann (1922) argued that 
mass media often constitutes the sole information source for the general public in 
an election campaign. McCombs and Shaw (1972) and many following studies show 
empirically how strong the influence of the media is on the public’s perception of key 
political issues.
The relevance of agenda setting is emphasised by the idea of issue ownership 
(Petrocik, 1996). Traditionally, the election outcome is thought to depend on how 
close politicians’ decisions are to voters’ preferences (Downs, 1957). Petrocik (1996) 
introduces the view that the perceived competence of a politician in a particular 
field (‘issue ownership’) is relevant for his success. Consequently, politicians’ success 
depends on whether their core competencies are ‘high on the agenda’. Abbe, Goodliffe, 
Herrnson and Patterson (2003) find evidence of the relevance of issue salience in 
elections. In this fine of argument, recent work in both political science and economics 
has considered how politicians structure their campaigns.
Puglisi (2004) models endogenous agenda setting in a multi-dimensional policy 
space where citizen vote on ‘salient’ issues, which were reported by the media to
2 STRATEGIC TIMING 51
require attention. Incumbents can make statements about particular issues to be 
urgent for media coverage. Predictions of the model are directly related to the agenda 
setting process, namely that the incumbent’s messages are more prominent in the 
media and that politician who were covered more often are more successful.
Berliant and Konishi (2005) model the campaign debate and consider topics to be 
salient if they were discussed by the politicians. They find that the office-motivated 
politicians want to talk about as many topics as possible. Amoros and Puy (2007) 
assume that parties spend resources on one of two salient issues. Their analysis focuses 
on whether parties spend resources on the same or on different topics. All of these 
papers revolve around the concept of issue ownership and agenda-setting. Our paper 
differs in that it considers the timing of the announcement to be important for the 
shaping of the discussion and the gathering of information without going into details 
on media channels.
The timing of announcements in this context has been studied by Bar-Isaac (2008), 
who applies the model of bounded memory by Wilson (2003) to explain voter’s de­
grees of receptiveness for information at various points in the campaign. The largest 
receptiveness of voters’ state-limited memory is in the beginning and at the end of the 
campaign, in line with empirical observations on campaign activities. Levy and Razin 
(2009, 2010) model agenda formation as a result of costly influence seeking of two 
candidates. Since agenda formation is modeled sequentially and policy decisions are 
made each period based on the agenda, results include an initial tendency of extrem­
ists to place items on the agenda and a slow evolution of the agenda. In our model, 
the timing is important to the candidates and voters for informational reasons during 
one election campaign.
Since the election campaign can be viewed as a special case of a debate, the 
papers by Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004) on debates and persuasion share some 
features with the current model. In Glazer and Rubinstein (2001), two speakers try 
to show evidence in order to convince a third party of their position. The model 
involves the timing of an argument, but is focused on the content of the arguments 
and counterarguments. In our model, the third party, i. e. the electorate learns about 
the relevance of the issue irrespective of the content of the statement. Before this 
happens, though, the early statement can help an incumbent’s cause.
2.3 G eneral features o f  th e  m od el
We consider a two-period campaign in which an incumbent I  and a challenger C 
campaign on two issues a and b. They compete to be elected by a continuum of 
heterogeneous voters.
Issues. As mentioned above, there are two issues, a and b. The optimal policy on 
issue i is equal to the state of the world on that issue, where Ui € {—1,1}, i — a, b. The
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states of the world axe unknown during the campaign, but become known before the 
voters cast their vote. Only one of the issues is relevant, but the identity of the relevant 
issue is discovered only after the election has taken place. The prior probability that 
issue a is relevant is r, which is a public information signal drawn from a uniform 
distribution over [0, k] with \  < k < 1. The signal r becomes public after the electoral 
campaign, when the voters axe about to decide their electoral behaviour. Notice 
that k >  ^ ensures that both issues have a positive probability of being perceived as 
‘more likely to be relevant’. The ex-ante probability that a is the more relevant issue, 
however, is £^=1 < while ^  is the ex ante probability for 6 . With probability z the 
relevant issue can also be urgent. Urgency is a characteristic that only relevant issues 
can have, and it implies that the incumbent is forced to act upon that issue in the first 
of the two periods; z  is therefore the conditional probability that the issue is urgent 
given that it is relevant. To understand the difference between relevance and urgency, 
think of issue a as the national economy, and issue b as the immigration policy of 
the country. We could have that the relevant issue is the national economy, but this 
could mean that we need to reform the pension scheme over the course of the new 
Parliament (relevant but not urgent), or it could mean that the national debt is so 
high that we need to impose immediately a one-off tax to avoid bankruptcy (relevant 
and urgent). The first would be an example of the national economy being a relevant 
but not urgent issue, the second one would be the case in which the economy is both 
relevant and urgent. The same reasoning can be made about immigration policy. We 
might want to reform the rights of the immigrants (relevant but not urgent), or we 
might need to deal with boats of irregulars landing on our coasts (relevant and urgent).
Voters. There is a continuuum of voters, each of them caring only about one issue. 
We call the voters’ ideological types 6a or 9b, where having an ideological type 6j 
means that j  is the issue that the voter cares about; the probability that voter z’s 
ideological type is 6a is Each voter follows a simple behavioural rule; he goes to 
cast his vote if and only if the (posterior) probability that the issue he cares about will 
be relevant for the next government is greater than q , which could be interpreted for 
example as a cost of voting. This variable q is independently drawn from the uniform 
distribution on [0,1] for each voter. Therefore the voters axe heterogeneous along two 
dimensions, their ideological type and their cost of voting.
Since there is a continuum of voters and the cost distribution is the same across 
the two ideological groups, the election will be determined by the ideological group 
associated with the issue that has the largest ex post probability of being the relevant 
one. This can be seen by noticing that, given an ex post probability p of issue a being 
the relevant one, the fraction of voters of that group who will actually vote is F(p) =  p, 
while the fraction of voters with ideological type b who will vote is F (1 — p) = 1 — p.
If the voters are indifferent on the issue they care about because both candidates 
proposed the same policy, we assume that they vote randomly. One can think of details
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in the campaign being relevant, which axe not modelled explicitly, for example the 
result of the last TV debate on this issue or the candidates’ credibility to also prioritise 
this issue. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that voters of one group randomise 
in a coordinated way, voting all for the same candidate. This again, can be thought 
of as coming from details in the campaign which group j  voters evaluate similarly. 
Therefore the median voter will always belong to the largest group of voters. It will 
hence be ex ante unpredictable which candidates he will endorse. The candidates’ 
positions on the issue preferred by the minority group will not influence neither the 
median voter’s decision19 nor the election outcome. Given that the two groups of 
potential voters are equally large, and given their coordinated randomisation in case 
of ties, the median voter will belong to group a if and only if p > 1 — p, that is if 
/>>§•  In this case the election will be determined by the position of the candidates 
on issue a.
Candidates. As mentioned above, there are two candidates, an incumbent I  and 
a challenger C. Candidates maximise the probability of being elected by taking one 
of two positions {—1 , 1 } on both issues. At the beginning of period 1 each candidate 
receives two signals, one per issue. We denote with Sj G  { — 1 , 1 }  the incumbent’s signal 
on issue j ,  and with tj G  {—1,1} the challenger’s one, j  = a, b. Fs signal on issue j  is 
correct with probability 7 .^ C’s signal tj is correct with probability 5j = § for both 
issues. This implies that the challenger’s signals are equally good; he does not have 
a preference for either of the issues. The incumbent is instead specialised on issue a, 
where 7 a >  ^ +  s. We assume his signal on b to be basically uninformative, but, to 
avoid a complete indifference of the incumbent on issue b we assume that 7 j, =  \  +  e, 
so that he has a weak incentive to follow his own signal. The structure is such that 
the incumbent can have an objectively worse (7 0 < | )  or better ( j a > | )  signal than 
the challenger on the issue he is specialised in.
In both periods the incumbent is governing the country, but we interpret only 
the second one as the proper electoral campaign. Therefore we assume that only the 
incumbent can take a stand on the different issues in the first of the two periods.20 
Every politician can take a stand on each issue only once because they can effectively 
commit on the proposed policies.
The challenger’s strategy maps from the signal space into the action space
<t c : { - 1, 1}2 - { - 1, 1}2 
associating a pair (Pa,Pb) °f promises to the pair of signals.
19This can be justified by the strong sense of preference for one issue.
20This is without loss of generality. As will be clear from the description of the model, the challenger 
has no extra information on the issues’ relevance that can induce the voters to update their beliefs. 
Therefore an early announcement by the challenger would simply reveal his strategic position to the 
incumbent, without changing the probability that the election focuses on a specific issue.
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The incumbent’s strategy is more elaborate, and contains two extra elements. 
First, he receives an extra signal C G {a, 6 ,0} that, in case the relevant issue is urgent, 
tells him what the relevant issue is, and force him to act on it. The urgency of the 
issue implies that, if the incumbent remains inactive on that issue, its urgency will be 
revealed to the voters, and the incumbent will not be elected in the following period 
as a punishment for the absence of timely measures. Several examples fit the idea of 
politicians making the electorate believe that an issue is urgent when it is not, while 
they have hard time hiding an urgent issue from the public. For example, in the case 
of a potentially pandemic flue, the government can promote a plan of vaccinations 
and a set of restrictive measures to protect the country. In this case, if the people 
get the vaccine, they cannot know for sure whether it was really a critical situation 
or not; on the contrary, if the government does not adopt any special measure and 
the flu spreads quickly, everyone will know that the government failed to act on time. 
Similarly, a politician could argue to increase the number of prisons because they are 
overcrowded and a potential source of rebellion. If the government builds new prisons 
(or relaxes the criteria of arrest) nobody will be sure of the level of urgency of the 
matter; however, after riots in the prisons, it will be obvious to the electorate that the 
government has underestimated the situation.
Even when the relevant issue is not urgent (in which case the incumbent’s infor­
mation on the issue relevance is the same as the challenger’s), the incumbent still has 
the extra choice to commit to a policy in the first period or not. Therefore the action 
space becomes {A,i?,0} x {—1 , l } 2, where A  indicates the choice of promising p7 in 
the first period, B  the choice of promising p[ in the first period, and 0 the choice of 
waiting until the second period. The incumbent’s strategy therefore is:
a1 : {a, b, 0} x { - 1 , l } 2 -  {A, B , 0} x { - 1 , l } 2, 
where the following restrictions apply:
• 0-7 (a ,so,s b) e {A} x {—1, l } 2;
• af (b,8a,Sb) € {B j  x {—1, l } 2.
No restriction applies to <j7 (0, sa, s\,).
Tim ing. We can now summarise the timing of the electoral campaign. The voters 
axe characterised by their ideological type and by their cost variable c*. At the 
beginning of the first period the incumbent receives his triple of signals (£, sa, s*,) and 
the challenger receives his pair of signals (£a,£&). In the first period the incumbent 
decides whether to promise p7, pi or nothing (where his choice is constrained in the 
case of an urgent issue), all other promises are revealed in the second period. Then r,
uja and u>b are revealed, and the voters cast their vote. The situation is represented
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in the figure below, where pj in period 2  needs to be equal to pj in period 1 if it has 
been expressed.
@i, Ci 
sai sb ta, tfj £
t = 0  
t = 1
t -  2
t = 3
Incumbent
Pi Pb
Incumbent Challenger
I I
{vW b)
Voters
(Pa^Pb)
C
Figure 7: Timing
2.4  T h e sim u ltan eou s choice
In this section, we consider the optimal behaviour of the candidates when nothing is 
announced in the first period. In this case, competition is simultaneous in that both 
candidates announce their positions in the same period. Therefore we restrict the 
incumbent’s strategy to be a vector of positions. The challenger and the incumbent 
are in a completely symmetric position, and the only aspect that distinguishes them 
is the precision of their signals.
Notice that the candidates can optimise their behaviour on each of the issues 
independently. Recall that voters know the state Uj when they cast their votes. 
The choice of the optimal strategy on a affects the probability of winning if the 
voter considers a as the relevant issue, and the choice of the strategy on b affects 
the probability of winning on b. Whenever nothing is said in the first period the two 
issues are fully independent, as the probability of the voter considering either of the 
issues is independent of the policies chosen by the candidates in the second period.
Proposition 6  I f  the incumbent chooses 0 in the first period, it is a dominant strategy 
for both candidates to follow their own signals in the second period.
Proof. Let the incumbent I  be the row player, and the challenger C  the column 
player. The challenger has only four pure strategies: to play p f  = 1 regardless of 
the signal, to play p f  = — 1 regardless of the signal, to follow his own signal on both 
issues, or to go against his own signal on both issues. For the incumbent, consider
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the two possible choices of pj =  {—1,1} when his signal on issue j  is Sj = 1. The 
matrix below shows the incumbent’s expected probability of winning given his signal 
and given the four pure strategies of the challenger.
S j  = 1
p f  =  1
Chal 
P? =  - l
lenger
p f  =  h p f  = - t j
T)l _ 1 1
2 7j 5 +  £
p< =  - 1 1 -  77
1 ...
2
2 ‘]± 
3 2 5 _  -Jl6 2
Table 1 : Incumbent’s expected probability of winning
For example the probability of winning when Sj = 1 and both the incumbent and 
the challenger follow their signal is
Prfe =  1| Uj =  1 )Pr(wj =  %  = 1) \  + Prfe  =  = 1 )Pr(uj = l\sj = 1)
+  Pr(£j =  1| u j = - 1  )Pr{u)j = - %  =  l ) i  =  i  +  ^ .
Given that 7 j > it can easily be seen that following his signal is optimal for 
the incumbent in this case. The reasoning can be generalised to Sj = —1 and to the 
challenger’s choice. ■
2.5 T he seq u en tia l gam e
In the previous section we considered the optimal behaviour of the candidates when 
they both speak in the second period. We consider now the sequential game. The 
incumbent’s advantage from taking a stand in the first period is related to the possi­
bility of shaping the electoral debate by shifting the attention of the voters towards 
one specific issue. Without this effect, instead, the campaign game displays a first 
mover disadvantage, since whoever reveals his position earlier allows the opponent to 
infer his signal (or in a more general setting to infer something about his signal) and 
eliminates any possible information advantage. In order to develop the analysis of the 
sequential game we now begin with the challenger’s optimal behaviour.
2.5.1 The challenger
The challenger only speaks in the second period. Therefore, in order to understand the 
differences between the simultaneous and the sequential case, we need to understand 
first the challenger’s optimal response when he observes the incumbent’s promise pj 
in the first period.
Moreover, given the assumption on the correlated randomisation the challenger’s 
statement in the second period does not affect the probability that the median voter 
is of a particular ideology. This is due to the fact that the nature of the median voter 
is decided simply on the base of what issue is more likely to be relevant.
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Proposition 7 When the challenger observes pj and believes that pj = Sj his optimal 
promise in the second period is p = pj if 7  ^ > Sj — |  and pj7 — tj otherwise.
Proof. Given that he does not affect which issue the election is decided upon, the 
challenger chooses his optimal promise on issue j  in order to maximise the probability 
of winning in case the median voter is of ideological type Qj. This probability is equal 
to \  if the challenger mimics the incumbent by setting pj7 = pj.
If tj — Pj the challenger trivially sets pj7 = tj =  pj and wins with probability \ . If 
tj ^  p^ and the challenger does not mimic the incumbent, his probability of winning 
is
0 /  * ij. _l j ) \
~  ^  ~  6, (1 -  7J) + 7,(1  -  Sj) ( -  2 -  7j  )  ’
which is greater than  ^ if 7 j > Sj = ■
2.5.2 The incumbent
For the incumbent promising pj =  Sj is always a weakly dominant strategy, even when 
the promise is made in the first period. We already showed this for the simultane­
ous announcements; the following proposition extends the results to the first period 
promises.
Proposition 8  It is a weakly dominant strategy for the incumbent to promise Pj = Sj 
even when speaking in the first period.
Proof. There are two possible cases, depending on the challenger’s behaviour:
• if the challenger mimics the incumbent, then the probability of winning on that 
issue is \  regardless of what the incumbent promised;
• if there is a positive probability that the challenger does not mimic the incum­
bent, then promising pj =  Sj yields a strictly higher payoff, as shown in the 
simultaneous case.
Moreover, remember that there axe cases in which the incumbent has a very con­
strained set of feasible actions. If £ € {a, b} the incumbent is forced to act on the 
issue that is urgent. In that case, he will promise pj in the first and pJ_^ in the second 
period.
To describe fully the incumbent’s optimal strategy in the first period we need to 
know how observing a promise in the first period changes the voters’ beliefs about the 
relevant issue. The updating is induced by the possibility that the relevant issue is 
urgent. Observing a promise on issue j  in the first period has some informative value 
on its relevance.
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Consider for example issue a. As we explained above, the prior probability that 
a is relevant for the voter is r ~  C/[0 , k], with  ^ < k < 1 , where r is a public signal 
that is revealed just before the elections and represents the probability that issue a is 
relevant for the future goverment period. The prior probability that the voter believes 
that a is more likely to be relevant is > 0. With 2  being the probability that the 
relevant issue is urgent and y the probability that a is spoken about in equilibrium, 
the posterior belief, via Bayes rule, becomes
(z + y( 1 -  z))r
P = (z +  y( 1 -  z))r +  (1  -  r)(l -  z)y'
Given that we consider pure strategy equilibria (as the mixed strategy ones arise 
only for non-generic values of the parameters) we can focus on the case in which y = 1 , 
so that the posterior becomes
P = r 4 - (1  — r)(l — z)
If p is greater than  ^ the median voter’s ideological type is a, which occurs when
( 1—z)r > 2 -z  • Conversely, the median voter’s ideological type is a when b is spoken about 
in equilibrium for r > 7^ .
2.6  E quilibrium  behaviour
With both the challenger’s and the incumbent’s incentives specified, we can now in­
vestigate which behaviour prevails in equilibrium.
Proposition 9 Given the challenger’s optimal behaviour derived in Proposition 7, it 
is optimal for the incumbent in the first period to promise p£ = sa if j a < E and to 
wait until the second period otherwise, where the threshold S =  ^ z ( 2k^\)(2 -z) ^  '
Proof. Given the almost uninformative signal on 6 , it is never optimal for the in­
cumbent to promise something on this issue. The challenger never mimics what the 
incumbent says on 6 . Therefore the only effect of an eaxly promise on b is to increase 
the probability that the median voter’s ideological type is b, which lowers the incum­
bent’s probability of winning. As a consequence, the only possible early announcement
i s p i
If we want to characterise the equilibrium, we can distinguish three different para­
metric regions:
1 - 7 a < §• Due to the low signal precision, the challenger does not mimic the 
incumbent after a promise in the first period. As a consequence, the incumbent 
will always promise something on a in the first period and thus increase the 
probability that the median voter’s type is a. This can be done at no cost,
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because the challenger’s behaviour does only depend on his signal not on the 
incumbent’s announcement.
2. |  < 7 a < E. In this region the incumbent is better at issue a than the challenger, 
but he still decides to compromise his probability of winning on issue a in order 
to increase the probability that the median voter’s type is effectively a. As a 
consequence, he announces p£ = sa in the first period.
3. 7 0 > S. In this case the incumbent’s specialisation is so strong that he would lose 
a significant advantage if he spoke in the first period and let the challenger mimic 
him. This is not counterweighted sufficiently by an increase of the probability 
that the median voter have ideology a. Therefore he does not announce any 
policy in the first period.
In fact when j a > |  the incumbent’s probability of winning if he announce his 
policy on a in the first period is
k( 2 — z) — (1 — z) 1 1 — 2  5
k { 2 -  z) 2  + k(2 — z) 1 2 ’
while his probability of winning if he does not announce his policy on a in the first 
period is
2k \ 6  2 J  2k 12'
By comparing the two expressions we can show that S =  ^ ^ 2k^\){2 -z) ^  •
Notice that E > | ,  while E < 1 whenever k > ^ - z ) > \-
To summarise, the characterisation of the equilibrium, depending on the parametric 
value of 7 j is represented in Figure 8 .
bO
Pa =Pa  
Pb = t b
11
2
2
3
Figure 8 : Equilibrium behaviour
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We can see that the incumbent’s is less likely to influence the electorate when 
7 a is high. This is due to the fact that speaking in the first period reveals useful 
information to the challenger. In the middle column, the challenger already makes 
use of that information when it is informative enough. At some point it becomes too 
precious to give away freely, so that the incumbent stays silent in the first period.
Notice that the threshold H is decreasing in k. An increase in k increases the ex 
ante probability of a being the relevant issue, and therefore increases the importance 
of the loss of advantage on issue a due to the early announcement.
2 .7  U nknow n sp ecia lisa tion
So far we have assumed that the incumbent’s specialisation is common knowledge. 
Further insights can be obtained by relaxing this assumption such that the speciali­
sation of the incumbent is known but the extent of the specialisation, 7 a, is a random 
variable whose realisation is not known.21 We assume that 7 a is distributed according 
to a continuous density function f ( /ya) with support +  e, 1], so that it is never the 
case that the incumbent is more competent on issue b than on issue a. We maintain 
common knowledge of the fact that \  +  e. Now the incumbent’s action provides 
information about his precision on either issue and the equilibrium behaviour depends 
on the expected E{^fa) as well as 7 0.
Proposition 10 I f  E{/ya) < | ( =  8a) the equilibrium of the sequential game with 
incomplete information on 7 a has the incumbent announcing p£ =  sa in the first 
period for every value of j a, and pb = sb in the second period, and the challenger 
announcing p*f = tj in the second period, j  = a, b.
Proof. Assume that the challenger mimics the incumbent if he speaks in the first 
period, and suppose that in equilibrium it is optimal for the incumbent to speak on a 
for some type j a. In this case it is optimal for him to speak also for any 7 a < 7 a. In 
fact, the incumbent finds optimal to speak on a in the first period if
k( 2 — z) — (1 — z) 1 1 — z 5
k(2 -  z) 2  +  k(2 -  z) 12
is greater than
2fc — 1 ( I  7o\  1 5
2 k \ 6  2  J 2k 12
Given that the difference between the two is decreasing in 7 a, if the inequality holds 
for 7 a it holds also for every 7 0 < 7 a. Therefore, if the unconditional expected value 
of 7 0 is smaller than |  the challenger will never mimic the incumbent because the 
expected precision of the incumbent given that he speaks in the first period will never
21 Another way of introducing incomplete information is to maintain common knowledge about the 
extent of the specialisation, 7 . £ {^ ,7 } and 7 a A  7 b> but to assume private knowledge about the 
issue on which the incumbent is specialised.
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be greater than | ,  given that E (7 a) < | .  As a consequence, promising sa in the first 
period will always be optimal for the incumbent, since it will induce a gain in the 
probability of the median voter being of ideological type a without any loss in terms 
of probability of winning on issue a. ■
The actions are comparable to the case of complete information with j a < | , only 
that the incumbent’s action now does not change with the true 7 0.
Proposition 11 I f  E (7 a|7 a < S) > |  in equilibrium the incumbent announces p£ =  
sa in the first period if and only if la  < E; in this case the challenger mimicks him on 
a. (Otherwise, he is silent in the first period and the challenger follows his signals.)
Like in the complete information case, S =  threshold were
the incumbent’s behaviour switches from speaking in period 1 and being mimicked to 
not speaking in period 1 .
Proof. Let’s start noticing that the incumbent will speak in the first period for any 
7 a < E. As we proved in proposition 4, it is always the case that the incumbent 
promises p£ =  sa in the first period when 7 0 < S. Given this incumbent’s behaviour, 
and the fact that E{7 a|7 a < S) > | ,  moreover, the challenger will always mimic the 
incumbent, when pJa is promised in the first period. As a consequence, the incumbent 
will wait until the second period whenever j a > S. ■
Proposition 12 I f  E{^a[ya < 2) < |  and E (7a) > §, in equilibrium the incumbent 
announces pJa = sa in the first period if and only if 7 a < E', where S' > S is such 
that E (rya\'ya < E') =  | .  The challenger mimics the incumbent with probability (3 such 
that the incumbent is indifferent between speaking in the first and in the second period 
when 7 a =  S'.
In this intermediate region, the challenger mixes between mimicking the incumbent 
and following his own signal.
Proof. We analyse the situation by considering the challenger’s possible strategies, 
and the incumbent’s best responses to them:
• if the challenger never mimics the incumbent when he makes a promise on a in 
the first period, the incumbent announces pJa = sa in the first period for any 
value of 7 a; however, in this case, it is optimal for the challenger to mimic the 
incumbent, given that E ( ja) >
• if the challenger always mimics the incumbent when he makes a promise on 
a in the first period, the incumbent announces p!a = sa in the first period for 
any j a < E; in this case, however, the challenger has no incentive to mimic 
the incumbent, given that the expected precision of the incumbent signal is
E {la\la < S) < I-
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• if the challenger mimics the incumbent with probability 0 < (3 < 1, the incum­
bent has an incentive to promise p^ =  sa as long as the incumbent’s probability 
of winning by announcing pTa = sa in the first period,
k { 2 - z ) +  U P j 1^6 2 j j  fc(2 - 2 ) 1 2 ’
is greater than his probability of winning by being silent in the first period is
2fc — 1 / I  7a\  1 5
2k \6  2 J 2k 12'
Equating the two gives us E((3) = ‘ lt can be noticed
that
— E{(3) =  E when (3 = 1]
— E(/3) =   ^ when (3 =  0;
— S(/3) is decreasing in (3\
— E{(3) has  a discontinuity at (3= 2(2k-i+~z-zk) •
Figure 9 shows H(/2) for a specific value of and 2 , but the shape of the function 
remains the same across parameters.
-10
-15
-20 100
(a) k  - 0.75 and z  — 0.5 
Figure 9: E{(3).
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Therefore the incumbent finds optimal to speak in the first period if:
J 7„ < S (P) and 0  > H2k-{+z-zk)
\  7 a > a(/3) and p < 2(2k_1z+z_ ,ky
Notice that if (3 < 2(2k-i+z-zk) incumbent finds optimal to speak in the first 
period for any 7o, given that E(/3) < \ . 22 Moreover if 2(2k-i+z-zkj < P < 2k-i+z-zk> 
H(/3) > 1 , and therefore the incumbent optimally speaks in the first period for 
any j a. Therefore the incumbent optimally speaks in the first period if:
(  0  > 2k-i+z-,k and 7 . < a 0 ?)
\  & — 2k-l+z-zk'
Given that E { j a) > |  by assumption, we will never have an equilibrium where 
(3 < 2k—\+z—zk > because in this parametric region the incumbent speaks in the 
first period for every 7 a and the challenger finds strictly optimal to mimic him 
with probability 1. The equilibrium will then be found where /3 > 2k-i+ z-zk’
In this region, for a given H(/3) it is optimal for the challenger to randomise 
with probability (3 if and only if E (/ya\rya < S(/3)) =  | ,  so that the challenger 
is indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking the incumbent. Given 
that E{7 a|7 a < S(/3)) is continuous23 and increasing in H(/3), and given that
E i l a \ l a  <  S ( ! ) )  <  |>  a n d  E  ( 7 a l 7 a  <  ^ ( 2k - l + z - z k ) )  >  I ’ t h e r e  e x i s t  0 n ly  OIie
P € X)  SUGh that ^(7al7a < S(/?)) =
Therefore the unique equilibrium in this case is the one in which the incumbent 
promises p^ = sa in the first period if for any 7 a < S', such that E (7 a|7 a < S') =  | ,  
and the challenger mimics him with probability {3 =  S _1 (H').
■
2.8 A n  exam p le
Let’s consider a distributional example of this case. Assume that 7 a is distributed 
according to a uniform distribution over [0,T]. The three equilibria described above 
become:
1. For T < |  it is the case that E (7 a) < |  therefore the equilibrium is the one 
described in proposition 1 0 ;
2. For T > |  and k < it is the case that -E'(7 a|7 a < S) > | ,  given that S > 
in this case the equilibrium behaviour is the one described in proposition 1 1 ;
22This comes from the fact that H(/3) is decreasing in /5, and that H(0) =
23This is implied by / ( 7 a) being a continuous density function.
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3. Finally, for T > |  and k > we have a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the 
incumbent announces pJa = sa in the first period if 7 a < § .  The challenger mimics 
him with probability (3 = k(2-z)-(\-z) leaves the incumbent indifferent if 
he has j a = §.
2.9 P o litica l co m p eten ce  and th e  w elfare o f  vo ters
We now look at the welfare of the voters and want to understand the likelihood of 
electing a candidate who implements the correct policy on one or both issues. The 
problem is now how to weight the two issues, considering that one is relevant and 
the other is not. If we weight them equally, there is only one possible distortion, 
which comes from the challenger mimicking the incumbent when he speaks early, and 
therefore losing the information contained in his signal ta. If we consider instead 
the case in which the welfare of the voters depends on the probability of electing a 
candidate who implements the correct policy on the relevant issue, the voters’ expected 
welfare depends on the probability that at least one of the two candidates proposes a 
policy that is equal to the true state of the world, and on the probability of voting on 
the relevant issue. In the latter case an extra distortion is related to the way in which 
the action of the incumbent affects the probability that the median voter’s ideological 
type is the same as the relevant issue.
We chose the latter since a voter with ideological type 9a will vote only if the 
probability that issue a is relevant is greater than a certain threshold value, which can 
be interpreted as a cost. Therefore it seems reasonable that the relevant issue should 
have a higher weight in the voter’s welfare function.
In the simultaneous (benchmark) case, when the incumbent only speaks in the 
first period if the issue is urgent, the expected probability of voting the correct policy 
on the relevant issue is:
2 { E  (r) (1 -  (1 -  7 a )( i  -  Sa)) +  E ( l - r ) ( l - ( l -  7 6)(1 -  6b))} 
+(1 -  z)  j p r  ( r  >  ^  E  ^r|r >  ^  (1 -  (1 -  7o) ( l  -  $a))
+  E  ( l  -  rlr >  i )  +  i
+ Pr (r < E ~ r^r < 5) ^ ^ “ 76^ 1 “ 5b))
+  E +  7 6 - ^ 6  , 1  -  7 6  + Sb r n  7 a  H------------------   S ,Oil
In fact, with probability 2: the issue is urgent and the incumbent is forced to act 
in the first period. The voters recognise that the issue must be urgent (and relevant) 
and only those interested in that issue vote. With probability 1 — z the issue is not 
relevant. In this case the voters’ behaviour depends on the realisation of the public 
signal r. If r > \  the median voter’s ideological type will be 6a\ the median voter 
will be able to choose a candidate with the correct proposed policy with probability
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1 — (1  — 7 a)(l — Sa)- Therefore the candidate that will be elected is the one who offers 
the best policy on a. With probability (1  — r), however, the relevant issue is b. If 
the incumbent is elected (which happens with probability ) the probability
of having the correct policy on b is 7 b; if the challenger is elected (with probability 
— the probability of having a correct policy on b is db. If r < \  the median 
voter has ideological type Of, and the probability of voting for the correct policy is 
symmetric.
Notice that in the benchmark case the probability that the incumbent is elected 
when the median voter’s ideological type is 9a is increasing in 7 0. This implies that 
a high specialisation lowers the probability of a correct policy on 6 if 6 is relevant 
when r > Even in the benchmark case, therefore, it is not always the case that the 
candidate who proposes the best policy on the relevant issue is elected.
There are three possible distortions that can reduce the citiziens’ welfare. First, if 
the incumbent makes promises in the first period, he distorts the perception of which 
issue is most likely to be relevant. If, as a consequence of this, the voters switch from 
considering one issue to considering the other one, their welfare is negatively affected.
Second, by promising something in the first period even when the issue is not 
urgent, he does not allow the voters to always recognise the urgency of the issues, and 
prevents them to have the best information for voting.
The third effect is related to the possibility that the challenger mimics the incum­
bent. If this is the case, the probability that the voters find a candidate who promises a 
policy equal to the state of the world is diminished, given that the challenger probably 
does not use the information contained in his signal.
There is however also a positive effect in this case: by having the challenger mim­
icking the incumbent, the probability that the incumbent is elected when the voters 
vote on issue a decreases, and therefore the probability of having a candidate who 
implements the correct policy on b increases.
2.9.1 The com plete information case
In the complete information case the welfare associated to the different equilibria is 
as follows:
1. when 7 a > S, the equilibrium has only one distortion, compared to the simul­
taneous case: if the relevant issue is a, and this issue is urgent, the incumbent 
is forced to act on it; in this case the challenger mimics him on a, given the 
incumbent’s high competence on the issue, and the probability of having the 
correct policy on a becomes 7 a instead of 1 — (1  — 7 a)(l — Sa). Therefore the 
citizens’ welfare is:
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* i E  (r ) 7a +  E  (! -  r ) (! -  (! -  7b)(l -  <*b))}
+ (1  -  z) j p r  ^  E  ^r|r >  (1 -  (1 -  7 a)( l  -  5a ))
+ E ( 1 - rlr> i ) ( i ± ^ 7 6 + i - t ± ^ , 6);
+  Pr ( r <C i )  E  ^(1 -  r)|r <  (1 -  (1 -  7b) ( l  - h ) )
+  E  [ r |r < iX1+  7 6 - ^ 6  , 1  ~  7 6  +  5b r o  7  a  +  --------------^ ------------- d
2 . when 7 a < §, the two distortions are the distorted probability distribution over 
the relevance of the issues, and the impossibility of recognising that a is urgent 
when it is; notice that if b is urgent it is recognised as such, given that it is not 
an equilibrium behaviour for the incumbent to speak on b when it is not urgent. 
As a consequence the expected welfare becomes:
z { E (  1 -  r )  (1 -  (1 -  7 & X 1 -  5&))}
+(1 -  z +  z • E(r))  j p r  ^  E  ^r|r >  ^  [1 -  (1 -  7 a ) ( l  -  tf0)]
+Pr < r - i) Kr|^ f "r - i)1 “(1 “ 7»)(1" ^
, c / ,  , 1 ~ z  ^  ^  l \  ( l + 7 a ~ 5 *  , 1 - 7 a + 5 a r V+ E ^  -  r| _  < r < _ j ^-----   7l + ------------J,j
+  Pr ( r  <  7  E  f l - r | r  <  i — [1 -  (1 - 7 t ) ( l  -  i 6)]
The first difference here is that voters recognise the issue as urgent only if the 
urgent issue is b. The second difference is that for values of r between and \  
the median voter’s ideological type is a, despite b being the more likely relevant 
issue.
3. when |  < 7 0 < H, both distortions are present. In this case the expected welfare 
becomes:
z { E (  1 -  r) (1 -  (1 -  7 t ) ( l  -  <sb))}
+(1  — z +  z  ■ E(r) )  < Pr(r >  —) E (r\r >  ^)[7al +  ^ (1  ~  r\r >
4- P r(-— -  < r <  - )  \ E { r \ l — Z < r  <  - ) [ 7o] +  E(1  -  r |- — -  < r <  fo-
k2 - z ~ 2 J \ v l2 - z  -  2 n ' al v 2 — z “  2 J 2
+ Pr(r < \—-)2 — z E(1 -  r\r <  -  (1 -  76)(1 -  5b)} +  E(r\r <2 — z 2 — z 2
Now the probability that either of the candidates promises the correct policy
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on a is 7 a instead of 1 — (1  — 7 a)(l — 6a), given that the challenger mimics the 
incumbent on a, and therefore the informational containt of ta is lost. However, 
in this case, the probability that the incumbent is elected when the median 
voter’s ideological type is 9a is lowered, and therefore the probability that the 
voters elect a candidate who implements the correct policy on b is higher.
As it is shown in Figure 9, due to these distortions, the welfare is non monotonic 
7 a. The recurrent pattern of non-monotonicity is the following:
• in each region the voters’ welfare is increasing in 7 a;
• the highest welfare is attained in the region with high 7 0, the intermediate level 
of welfare is attained in the region with low j a, and the intermediate region of 
7 a is characterized by the lowest level of voters’ welfare.
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Figure 10: Welfare as a function of the precision j a. The dotted line is the benchmark.
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2.10 T h e unknow n specia lisa tion  case
In the unknown specialisation case considered in section 2.7, the type of equilibrium 
implemented depends on the distribution of 7 a and not on its specific realisation. In 
this case the voters’ welfare is indeed increasing in but is non-monotonic in E(7 a).
If E(7 a) < | ,  the only distortion is the one related to the perceived probability 
that issue a is relevant. In this case, no matter what /ya is, the incumbent promises 
Pa in the first period.
If E( 7 0) > | ,  instead, all the distortions are potentially present. First of all, if the 
incumbent speaks in the first period he is mimicked by the challenger with positive 
probability (either 1 or ^ depending on the value of E(7 a|7 a < H)). Second, as before, 
if the incumbent speaks in the first period he influences the perceived probability of 
relevance of issue a. Moreover, given that the incumbent speaks on a in the first 
period with positive probability even when a is not relevant, the voters are not able 
to recognize the urgency of a.
However, for a given distribution, the voters’ welfare is increasing in j a.
2.11 D iscu ssion  and possib le  ex ten sion s
We made strong assumptions on the behaviour and the information of the agents to 
keep the model simple. The following are two natural directions in which the model 
can be extended.
2.11.1 A wider state space
In the basic model, both candidates could only take one of two positions on both 
issues. One natural extension is to allow for an intermediate position which can be 
thought of as maintaining the status quo on the issue at hand. The state space would 
then be {—1 , 0 , 1 }.
The consequence of such a change is that sometimes candidates ‘play safe’ and 
do not take a firm stand, but rather announce the status quo. Moreover, one can 
show that there are situations in which the incumbent prefers to announce the status 
quo on his weak issue than following the signal on the issue he is specialised in. This 
happens when his signal on the issue of specialisation is very weak and it favours a 
change from the status quo. In this case it might be more profitable for the incumbent 
to attract attention to his weak issue by committing to the status quo policy on the 
weak issue rather than attracting attention to the issue he is better at. This is due to 
the fact that his knowledge of the state of the world on the issue of specialisation is 
not sufficiently strong to convince him to take a stand against the status quo, but it 
is in any case a signal of a possible change of the state.
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2.11.2 Political debates
The trade-off between waiting to gather better information and speaking early to 
influence the focus of the campaign described in our paper does not only appear in 
election campaign, but also in everyday political debates. In US-American debate 
about off-shore oil drilling, new information on the risks of a preferred option was 
revealed after a positioning by President Obama.
“On March 31, 2010, President Obama proposed to open vast expanses of Amer­
ican coastlines to oil and natural gas drilling, much of it for the first time, in an 
apparent bid to win political support for energy and climate legislation. But that idea 
-  which prompted distress among environmentalists and tepid support from Republi­
cans -  was sharply set back by the massive oil slick created in the Gulf of Mexico in 
April after a drilling rig exploded and sank off the Louisiana coast. [...] Mr. Obama 
ordered a freeze on new offshore drilling leases until a review of the oil rig accident 
could be concluded, and new safeguards put in place.” (NY Times, 14 May, 2010)
An opposite example can be found in the way German chancellor Angela Merkel 
behaves in political discussions. The so-called ‘Merkel method’ was described in a 
recent portrait as follows: “She recognizes questions early and answers very late. [...] 
It is this late and precise nature of her actions, which pushes others towards irrational 
activities, acting too early and imprecise. [...] Unafraid of phases of chaos she observes 
the work of collective intelligence, lets discourses mature, composed and nearly without 
command. She hopes that the chaos will bear an order that performs better than 
anything that had been in the heads of individual debaters. And the citizens shall 
chafe at reality, not at her.” (Die Zeit online, 9 April, 2010) The flipside of this 
behaviour is a lack of profile and leadership that is often criticised. “To use a phrase 
from Christian Wulff [a fellow Christian democrat and current German president], 
Angela Merkel leads ‘the herd from behind’. Often she cannot be seen behind the 
herd and offers few references and little superstructure for her politics. [..] It is 
questionable whether she works enough on developing new structures and uncovering 
new horizons.” New horizons for the US energy policy was exactly what Obama 
worked on at the end of March.
Neither of the two examples was set in a specific election campaign context. While 
we expect our model’s predictions to be most pertinent in situations of election cam­
paigning, we believe that it also captures features of regular political debates outside 
a specific election campaign.
Within one term, many small debates might occur sequentially in each of which 
politicians face the choice between pushing one issue early on and waiting for more 
information. The successes in individual debates possibly adds up to the election 
outcome at the end of the term. In this case, we can think of the election outcome in 
our model as the evaluation of one debate, which is relevant to the politician since it 
contributes to his overall probability of being elected into office.
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To model the idea of interlinked sequential debates, we will need to expand our 
model to multiperiod interaction. By analysing the time at which announcements are 
made one can possibly see whether debates are following a specific pattern of activity, 
as was discussed in Bar-Isaac (2008).
Furthermore, introducing the arrival of new issues that compete for space on the 
agenda could model different debates that follow each other. Such a model would 
endogenise the length of a particular debate and give insights in the dynamics of 
political discussion, complementing the discussion of Levy and Razin (2009, 2010).
2 .12 C onclusion
In this paper we modeled the trade-off that the candidates experience in political 
debates between speaking early in order to influence the political agenda, and waiting 
for information about the opponent’s position or further information about the state 
of the world in order to make informed decisions.
In doing so, we assumed two asymmetries between the candidates; first, the in­
cumbent’s promises have more information value than the challenger ones, and as a 
consequence only the incumbent has the possibility of shaping the debate. Moreover, 
while the incumbent is specialised on one of the issues, the challenger’s signals have 
the same precision, regardless of the issue. We analysed under which circumstances 
the incumbent uses his information to shape the political discussion. So fax we have 
three sets of results.
First, we show that the challenger has an incentive to mimic the incumbent when 
his signal is more informative than his own.
Second, we show that the incumbent does not always have the incentives to influ­
ence the debate. If his signal is very informative, he refrains from giving his opponent 
the possibility of copying his policy. It is then more advantageous not to increase the 
perceived relevance, but to rely on the strong signal on the specialised issue.
Finally, we look at the welfare implication of this behaviour. We show that the 
welfare of voters is not increasing in the degree of the incumbent’s specialisation, and 
that it may be better to have a candidate that is absolutely not competent on both 
issues, than a candidate who is (partially) competent only on one of them.
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(a) k =  0.6 (b) k =  0.9
Figure 11: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 Q, z — 0.
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(a) k =  0.6 (b) k = 0.9
Figure 12: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 a, z =  0.1.
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Figure 13: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 a, z =  0.2.
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Figure 14: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 a, 2  =  0.3.
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Figure 15: Welfare as a function of the precision j a, z = 0.4.
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Figure 16: Welfare as a function of the precision j a, z =  0.5.
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Figure 17: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 0, z =  0.6.
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Figure 18: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 a, z — 0.7.
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Figure 19: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 a, z =  0.8.
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Figure 20: Welfare as a function of the precision 7 tt, z =  0.9.
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3 D iscretion and am biguity in elec 
toral campaigns: a look into 
the empirical evidence
3.1 In trod u ction
The announcements that candidates release during the electoral campaigns have been 
the subject of intense analysis by political scientists and economists. One of the 
features that has been focused upon is the politicians’ tendency to release statements 
that are vague, ambiguous or not very detailed; it has been observed that rarely the 
promises that candidates make during the campaign pin down their preferences or 
intentions.
In Chapter 1 I proposed a model of discretion in electoral campaigns, that resulted 
from viewing elections as a competitive delegation problem. I focused on cases in which 
candidates and voters have a joint interest in discretion that originates from having ex 
ante a similar advantage in retaining the possibility of adapting policies to a changing 
world.
The issue of vagueness in political statements has been discussed in several paper 
in the literature. Each of the available models analyses a specific cause, which results 
in different implications on its comparative statics. Many of these models are not 
in contrast with each other; in a sense, they are horthogonal explanations of effects 
that can coexist in the real world. Moreover, many of these papers deliver testable 
predictions about the comparative statics of the candidates’ discretion level. The 
aim of this paper is to compare the implications of these models, and look at the 
comparative statics displayed by the data to draw some conclusions on the plausibility 
of the different effects.
The work by Alesina and Cuckierman (1990) is among the most relevant theoretical 
papers on the issue. They present the problem of an incumbent who seeks to be 
reelected. His bliss point is private information and is stochastic. In this case the 
incumbent might have incentive to implement policies that are ambiguous (that do 
not reveal his bliss point) to increase his probability of being reelected ex-post even 
when the voters are risk-averse.
Glazer (1990) is more related to the model presented in Chapter 1. In his work, 
ambiguity of statements arises because of uncertainty in the bliss point of the median 
voter. As a consequence, his main prediction is that an increase in the uncertainty in 
the median voter’s bliss point increases the ambiguity level of the candidates. Chappell 
(1994) has instead a model in which candidates can choose whether to advertise their 
position or not, under the assumption that they have to be truthful; in his model 
candidates with extreme positions tend not to advertise when facing an opponent
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who is also an extremist, but they often will advertise when facing a centrist.
There are three other relevant papers, that however presents predictions that we 
cannot test with the available data. Meirowitz (2005) has a model in which the 
candidates’ political concerns depend on the type of election that they are facing 
(primary or general); this is due to the different pool of voters that characterise each 
type of election. As a consequence, candidates will choose higher levels of ambiguity 
in the primaries, and they will be more precise during the campaign for the general 
election. In particular they will tend to be more ambiguous during the primaries 
because they know they will learn more before the general electoral campaign, and 
they don’t want to commit too much while they are still informed.
Alesina and Holden (2008) propose a model where ambiguity is induced by the 
need to please two different groups. The two predictions of their model are that 
the introduction of campaign contributions increases the level of ambiguity of the 
politicians, and the same happens introducing primaries. Both predictions are hard 
to test because the data we analyse do not allow the comparison between elections 
with and without campaign contributions, or with and without primaries.
In Aragones and Neeman (2000) the candidates can choose the level of ambiguity 
of their announcements. They have incentive to do so, because they have a ‘taste 
for ambiguity’ motivated by the fact that ambiguous statements allow them to retain 
more freedom ex post without sacrificing their credibility. On the other hand, voters 
have an explicit dislike for ambiguity, as it increases the probability that the candidate 
will ex post implement a policy which is far away from their most preferred one. There 
are two possible equilibria of this electoral competition, in terms of proposed policies: 
if the gain from being in power is very high, relative to the benefits of ambiguity, 
both candidates will converge to the median voter position with a very low level of 
ambiguity; if they are low there will be policy differentiation, but the candidates will 
promise the same level of ambiguity. The problem with the empirical investigation 
of this model is that a measure of rents from being in power is not available in the 
data. The papers by Diermeier et al. (2005) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) propose 
a theoretical and empirical analysis of political rents and of their effects that may be 
a starting point for such analysis.
As mentioned above, these models are distiguishable both in terms of the de­
scription of the causes of politicians’ ambiguity and vagueness, and in terms of the 
predictions of the factors that affects these two variables. This paper tries to test which 
effects are present in the data, at least for those predictions that can be considered 
given the available dataset.
On the empirical side, there are two papers that deal with issues of ambiguity in 
elections. Campbell (1983) uses data from the American National Election Studies on 
the presidential elections from 1968 to 1980, in which respondents were asked to place 
themselves and the candidates on a seven points scale for several issues. Campbell 
estimates the ambiguity of the candidates on each issue as the standard deviation
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of such positioning, where a candidate is considered more ambiguous if for example 
some voters consider him weakly liberal and some weakly conservative; in his paper he 
investigates what electoral characteristics can be considered the main determinants 
of the candidates’ ambiguity level. He finds that candidates that are more distant 
from the predominant public opinion display higher ambiguity levels (negative effect 
of proximity), that issue salience has no direct effect on the levels of ambiguity, and 
that the effect of a dispersed public opinion is to increase issue ambiguity. Bartels 
(1986) develops a model of survey response that allows him, using the same dataset as 
Campbell (1983), to estimate the extent of issue ambiguity of the candidates from the 
data on those respondents who did not answer the questions about the candidates’ 
positioning on the seven point scale.
We use data from the American National Election Studies, from the Senate study 
conducted between 1988 and 1992. The methodology used is the one contained in 
Campbell (1986), therefore the ambiguity level of the candidate is proxied with the 
standard deviation of the electorate’s positioning of the candidate himself on seven 
point (liberal-conservative) scale. The data on Senate elections do not allow us to 
disentangle the effects of issue variety, as only the liberal-conservative scale is included 
in the questionary. The use of Senate data does however allow us to study a larger 
dataset.
The objective of this chapter is mostly descriptive. We investigate which of the 
correlations that are predicted by the comparative statics of the different models seem 
to be present in the data. At the moment we do not attempt to draw any conclusion 
about the causal relation that may be present between the variables that we consider. 
The reason for that is the presence of several endogeneity issues that may affect the 
analyisis. Moreover, we make use of a temporal variability that we cannot use as 
identification method. It is however interesting, as a preliminary empirical analysis, 
to investigate which of the models have implications that are consistent with the 
observed data.
The first significant finding is that the data are consistent with the model of Alesina 
and Cuckierman, in that an incumbent that is more likely to be reelected will be less 
ambiguous. This can be seen by noticing that approval rates are negatively correlated 
with the ambiguity levels, so that an incumbent with a high approval rate is less 
likely to be ambiguous than an incumbent with a lower approval rate. This effect is 
consistent with Alesina and Cuckierman (1990).
The second significative effect that we find is that, even though there is no direct 
effect of the candidates’ biases on the level of ambiguity, when we restrict attention 
to tight races, the level of ambiguity is negatively correlated with the candidate’s 
own bias. Of the two models that have predictions on the correlation between biases 
and ambiguity, we note that the empirical correlation is consistent with the model 
presented in Chapter 1 but not with Chappell (1994). Interestingly enough, both 
models predict an increase in the ambiguity levels when facing a more biased opponent,
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but this does not seem to be the case empirically.
We also find that an increase in the ambiguity levels is positively correlated with 
an increase in the dispersion of the voters’ preferences, which is consistent with the 
prediction contained in Glazer (1990). The dispersion of the voters’ preferences is 
defined as the standard deviation of their self-positioning on the seven-points liberal- 
conservative scale.
Lastly, there is a significant relation between the level of ambiguity in the Senate 
race and uncertainty over the state of the State economy. When we take the standard 
deviation of the respondent’s opinions about the state of the economy at a State 
level, we can see that this is positively correlated with the level of vagueness of the 
campaign, and that the effect is significative. This is consistent with Chapter 1 that 
plainly postulates that vagueness is a consequence of unresolved uncertainty about 
the correct policy.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses the models that we want 
to analyse, and their main predictions; section 3.3 describes the chosen methodology; 
section 3.4 describes the dataset, section 3.5 introduces the variables of interest, and 
the way in which they are computed; section 3.6 presents the results; section 3.7 
includes some robustness checks, section 3.8 discusses possible extension of this work, 
and section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 P rop osed  analysis
This section introduces four models that we would like to evaluate empirically. Notice 
that, as suggested before, there are models that we cannot evaluate, despite their 
relevance in the literature. In particular we cannot test the predictions of Meirowitz 
(2005) and Alesina and Holden (2008) because their suggested comparative statics 
are related either to the existence of primaries and the comparison between the first 
and the second stage in an election with primaries, or to the extent of the campaigns 
contributions. Since I use data from the Senate elections, and I have no information 
on the presence and extent of campaign contributions, I cannot test the implications 
of these two models. Testing Aragones and Neeman (2000) would instead require the 
analysis of the political rents of the different states, and is left for later work.
3.2.1 A lesina and Cuckierman (1990)
The model by Alesina and Cuckierman analyses one specific trade-off that a politician 
faces when choosing a policy that he wants to implement: the trade-off between his 
preferences and his popularity. Their model has the peculiarity of assuming asymme­
try in the available information on the two candidates. More precisely, the bliss point 
of one of the candidate is known, while the bliss point of the other one is stochastic 
and his private information. If the candidate with the privately know bliss point gets 
elected in the first period, he has an incentive to disguise it by choosing ambiguous
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policies. Notice that in their model only the incumbent has the power of choosing 
policies, and therefore he is the only one that can choose his level of ambiguity and 
disguise his ideological positioning it by choosing policies that have some noise. Many 
of the predictions of the model are hard to test, because they rely on this asymmetry 
with respect to the information that is available on the two candidates, and on the 
persistence of the ideological position of the one with stochastic positioning. However 
there is an interesting prediction that we can try to investigate.
Prediction. The level of ambiguity of the incumbent decreases when the popularity 
of the incumbent increases, where by popularity we mean the likelihood that the 
incumbent gets reelected regardless of his implemented policy.
We will investigate this effect by creating a proxy for the popularity of the incumbent 
from a question on the approval of the incumbent that is included in the survey; in 
this way it is possible to look directly into the effect that a higher popularity of the 
incumbent has on his choices.
3.2.2 Chappell (1994)
Chappell (1994) addresses the issue of ambiguity in electoral campaigns from the 
consideration that rational voters should be suspicious of ambiguous candidates.
In his model two randomly chosen candidates, X  and Y , confront each other 
during the campaign; their choice variable is the amount of information they want to 
disclose about their preferred policies x and y\ crucially, their preferred policies are 
disclosed to both candidates and not to the voters. The most relevant assumptions are 
the absence of commitment on policies (candidates always implement their preferred 
policy once elected), and a strong candidates’ credibility (candidates axe assumed to 
be truthful and they are believed by voters); moreover, a candidate cannot release 
credible information on his opponent. The information release action is assumed to 
be binary: a candidate can either advertise his position, or not. If candidate j  chooses 
to advertise his position, he will disclose it to a fraction Fj of voters; the fraction Fj 
is called the endowment of candidate j .
The voters in this model axe assumed to be suspicious of candidates in the sense 
that they update their beliefs on the candidates’ type via Bayes rule, so that they
infer something about the candidates’ types from the absence of advertisement of the
candidate’s position. Notice that the inference that voters can make is strong, because 
of the assumption that the policy positions x and y axe known to both candidates. 
Therefore, when they see candidate X  advertising the position x, and candidate Y  
not advertising his position they can infer that y is such that
- X  wants to advertise given (x,y)-,
- Y  does not want to advertise given (x,y)]
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where x  is now known.
From the analysis of the model Chappell obtains several predictions; in particular 
the ones that we can investigate with our data are the following ones.
Predictions. Candidates with centrist positions will generally advertise; candidates 
with extreme positions tend not to advertise when facing an opponent who is also an 
extremist, but they often will advertise when facing a centrist.
Other predictions are related to the candidates’ likelihood of winning, their different 
endowments, their expected vote share and the incumbency advantage. These cannot 
be analysed with the data that we use.
3.2.3 Glazer (1990)
In Glazer’s model ambiguity arises mainly as a consequence of the interaction between 
the uncertainty that the candidates have on the median voter’s ideal point, and the 
uncertainty that the median voter has on the candidates’ ideal points. There are two 
candidates who compete for office; they can choose whether to be precise and announce 
a specific policy (in which case they will announce their forecast of the median voter’s 
ideal point), or completely vague. If they are vague the median voter will evaluate 
them according to his beliefs on the candidate position. The model has therefore the 
following implication that we can analyse with the available dataset.
Prediction If the candidates’ beliefs on the median voter are more dispersed then 
the policies are more ambiguous.24
The model also predicts that if the median voter’s beliefs on the candidate are less 
dispersed, then there is more ambiguity. This is a prediction that we cannot test 
because, given the way in which we measure the candidates’ vagueness, we cannot 
disentangle the dispersion of the voters’ beliefs from the candidates’ ambiguity level. 
Other predictions of the model include that if the voters axe more risk averse there is 
less incentive to be ambiguous, and that if there are sequential announcements, than 
either the candidates are ambiguous, or they make their announcement at a very late 
stage.
3.2.4 M anzoni (2010)
In Chapter 1 1 present a model of electoral campaign in which there is a joint interest 
for discretion among voters and candidates. The extent of the optimal vagueness of 
the campaign statements from a candidate’s perspective is different from the voter’s
24To evaluate this prediction we consider the dispersion of the voters’ ideological position as a proxy 
for the dispersion of the candidates’ beliefs on the median voter’s position.
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perspective, but even the median voter would like in general to allow the candidates to 
retain some discretion. This is due to the fact that there is a state of the world that is 
unkown at the moment of the election, which influences both the candidates’ optimal 
policies, and the votes’ ones. The candidates are ideologically biased with respect to 
the median voter, but this bias is constant across states of the world. The optimal 
amount of discretion results therefore from the trade-off that the median voter faces, 
between the bias of the candidates and the variability of the state of the world.
As a consequence of that, the model has several implications on the candidates’ 
level of ambiguity. The predictions that we can investigate are the following.
Predictions. First of all the model shows a negative correlation between the level of 
ambiguity and the ideological bias of the candidate, and a positive correlation between 
the level of ambiguity and the level of uncertainty over the relevant state of the world. 
These two effects arise because of the voters’ taste for ambiguity; when the candidate’s 
bias is smaller, or when the state of the world is more uncertain, the voter would rather 
allow the candidate to have more discretion. Moreover, the model displays a positive 
correlation between the level of ambiguity and the opponent’s ideological bias. This is 
an equilibrium effect: when competing against a more biased opponent, the candidate 
can retain more discretion for himself, because he can win the election even if he 
pleases the electorate less.
The analysis of the extended version of model, which allows for uncertainty over 
the candidates’ biases, suggests a positive correlation between the level of ambiguity 
and the level of uncertainty over the candidate’s type for extreme candidates, and 
a negative correlation between the level of ambiguity and the level of uncertainty 
over the candidate’s type for centrist candidates. These predictions, however, cannot 
be tested, because, as we will see when we introduce the definition of the relevant 
variables, we cannot distinguish the uncertainty on the candidate’s type from the 
ambiguity of his statements.
3 .3 T h e m eth od o logy
As mentioned in the introduction, we follow Campbell (1983) methodology in order 
to perform a descriptive analysis of the consistency between the theoretical models 
we consider and the empirical correlations between the level of ambiguity and several 
explanatory variables.
Campbell searches for the most relevant explanatory variables for the level of 
ambiguity of the politicians. In order to do so, he considers the ANES questions 
(from the 1968 to 1980 presidential elections surveys) in which the respondents are 
asked to position the candidates’ stand on a specific issue on a seven point scale; he 
then estimates the candidates’ ambiguity levels on the different issues as the standard 
deviation of such positioning. He then tries to explain such levels with three variables:
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proximity (measured as the negative absolute value of the difference between the 
median of the candidate’s positioning on the issue, and the median of the voters’ own 
positioning on the same issue), issue salience (derived by specific questions on the most 
important problems for the country) and dispersion of the public opinion (measured 
as standard deviation of the voters position on the issue).
In order to increase the number of datapoints that we can consider we focus on data 
from the Senate elections from 1988 to 1992; this allows us to consider a larger number 
of candidates, but it does not allow us to separate the ambiguity levels on different 
issues, because only the positioning on the liberal-conservative scale is available for 
the Senate elections.
3.4  T h e data
The data come from the National Election Studies25 and refer to three subsequent 
election for the Senate (1988, 1990, 1992). Voters from each one of the 50 states were 
interviewed, and each survey was stratified by state.
The content of the surveys is incredibly wide, but very similar across years, as 
they were conceived as being part of a three-part study, and as a consequence they 
were built in a comparable way. Each survey covers a wide range of topics, so as to 
collect information on the voters’ preferences, on the campaign, on the candidates, but 
also on those Senators that are not running in the specific election that is considered. 
Moreover, the dataset includes contextual data, e.g. information about the Senate 
campaign such as election outcome predictions, and the economic outcomes of the 
state.
We will be focusing on a subset of the available data. The information that is used 
in this paper includes:
• voters’ self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale;
• voters’ placement of the candidates on the liberal-conservative scale;
• incumbency status of the candidate and incumbents’ approval rates;
• election outcome predictions;
• general information about the candidate, such as his party affiliation, his age, 
education level and previous government experience;
• voters’ perception of the current condition of the economy;
• voters’ self reported interest and level of information about politics.
A full description of the survey questions that have been used is contained in the 
appendix.
25Miller, Warren E., Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies. 
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, 1988, 1990, 1992 Pooled Senate Election Study [dataset]. Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor], 1999.
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3.5 V ariables o f in terest
As described above, we focus on the Senate data in order to investigate the correlations 
between the level of ambiguity of the electoral campaigns and other relevant variables. 
Below, we present a discussion of the variables of interest that will be later used in 
the empirical analysis. A full description of the survey questions that are used to 
create the variables, and of the way in which the variables themselves axe created is 
contained in the appendix.
Ambiguity. The main variable of interest is the ambiguity of the candidates. We 
measure their ambiguity (Amb) by considering the standard deviation of the voters’ 
perception of their positioning on the liberal-conservative scale. In doing so we follow 
the analysis by Campbell (1983).
Voters. Following Campbell (1983) we measure the dispersion of the voters’ pref­
erences as the standard deviation of the voters’ own positioning on the seven point 
liberal-conservative scale (SdJV). We also include controls as, for example, an aggre­
gate measure of the voters’ interest in politics, or information about politics.
Candidate variables. We consider the candidate bias (measured as the absolute 
value of the difference between the mean of his positioning and the median voter 
positioning on the liberal-conservative seven points scale), and his opponent’s bias. 
Moreover we add controls as the candidate’s age, his education level, his previous 
experience in federal or local government, and his party affiliation.
Incumbency variables. In order to analyse the incumbency effects, we introduce 
a dummy (In) that indicates whether the candidate was the incumbent. Moreover, 
we use the survey question that investigates the level of approval of the incumbent, 
and we create the interaction term In * A p p rJ n  that investigates whether incumbents 
with high approval from the electorate have indeed higher or lower levels of ambiguity 
in their electoral campaigns. The approval variable is generated by taking the mean of 
the incumbent’s approval rate. Notice that the incumbent’s approval question assigns 
value 1 to high approval and 5 to low approval, therefore the higher the value of the 
variable, the lower the incumbent’s approval.
Election variables. The main aspect of the election that we need to include as a 
control variable is the description of the context of the competition. We do so by 
including a dummy (Close) that describes whether the election result is perceived 
as being clearly in favour of one candidate, or as being uncertain. The ANES data 
include this information as well, coding two different polling results, one at an early 
stage of the campaign, and the other one at a later stage. We focus on the early 
one, because it is the one that better represents the situation that the candidates face
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when they choose their electoral strategy. We use the late result (Close-Late) as a 
robustness check.
Real world variables. In Chapter 1 the cause of candidates’ vagueness during the 
electoral campaign is attributed to the presence of a variable state of the world that 
influences the optimal policy, so that an increase in the variability of the state of 
the world induces the candidates to retain more discretion when making the electoral 
promises. To look into this prediction we need possible measures of the variability 
of the underlying state of the world. The survey helps us in this, because it asks 
each respondent to answer questions about the condition of the state economy and 
of the national economy. We take the standard deviation of the answers to these two 
questions and we use them as a proxy for the voters’ perception of the variability of 
the state of the world.
Strategic interaction term s. One of the concerns that we might have is that 
candidates behave in a different way when the election is close from when it is clearly 
in favour of one of the candidates. In particular, more than having a different level 
of ambiguity when the election is a tight one, we might be concerned by the fact 
that they respond in a different way to their own bias, or their opponent level of 
bias, or the uncertainty of the state of the world, when the strategic component is 
more important. For this reason we introduce a set of variables that describe this 
possible ‘strategic interaction’, showing that the candidates are induced to behave 
in a more strategic way when the result of the election is not easily predicted. For 
example the variable Cl * Bias is the interaction term between the variable Close 
and the variable Bias. If the variable Close was investigating the effects of a tight 
competition on the level of ambiguity, the variable Cl * Bias considers whether in 
case of a close race the candidate is more prone to adjust his level of vagueness to 
his ideological bias, or not. Even though none of the models considered includes the 
closeness as a possible explanatory variable, they all focus on situations in which the 
politicians behave strategically, maximising their chances of being elected. The idea 
here is to concentrate the attention on close elections because these are the ones where 
the strategic incentives of the candidate should prevail on other kind of goals that the 
politician can have (e.g. being perceived as a possible leader of the party, targeting a 
specific lobby group...).
3.6 T h e analysis
To analyse the empirical correlation between the ambiguity levels and the relevant 
variables that we want to study, we consider as dependent variable AmbiPt , that is, the 
level of ambiguity for each candidate of party p in State i at time t.26 As explanatory
26Notice that given the structure of the election the tuple party-State-year identifies uniquely the 
candidate.
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variables we include the variables described above, as the dispersion of the voters’ 
preferences, the candidate’s own bias, his opponent’s bias, a dummy that indicates 
whether he is the incumbent or not, the approval rate of the incumbent and so on.
Ambipt = (31SdJVit + (32Biasipt + /330ppJ3iasipt 4- PAInipt 4- P5In  * ApprJnipt 
+'ylSd-State-Economyit + {^Interaction terms}iPt 4- C,{Controls}ipt + €ipt
As mentioned above, the candidate is identified uniquely by the triple of indexes 
(i,p, t), where i is the State, p is the party, and t is the year. As for the explana­
tory variables, there are variables that depend only on the specific election we are 
considering (therefore only on the pair State-year), as the dispersion of the voters’ 
preferences, the dispersion of their opinion on the State or National economy, their 
interest in politics or their level of political knowledge. The other explanatory vari­
ables depend on the candidate that we are considering, as his bias, his opponent’s 
bias, his incumbency status and some of the controls, as age, education and previous 
government experience.
The analysis performed in this chapter is merely a descriptive analysis, that has 
the purpose of taking a first look on the relation between the theoretical models 
presented above, and the data. I am aware of the possible existence of endogeneity 
problems on some of the explanatory variables considered, in particular of the variables 
In , In  * A pprJn , Bias and close. A wider description of the potential endogeneity 
problems is included in section 3.6.1. As we suspect that there might be correlation 
issues we perform an OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
We run two different regressions, using two possible proxies for the variability of 
the state of the world: the standard deviation of the voters’ opinion on the State 
Economy (SdStateJEconom y) and the standard deviation of the voters’ opinion on 
the National Economy (Sd-National-Economy). The results of the regressions are 
displayed in Table 2.
3.6.1 Dispersion of the voters’ preferences
The first effect that can be noticed is the one signaled by the presence of a positive and 
significative coefficient for Sd-V. As in Campbell (1983) we take this as a measure of 
the dispersion of the voters’ preferences. The results show that the ambiguity level 
of the candidate’s campaign is positively correlated with the dispersion of the voters’ 
preferences. As a consequence whenever we observe an increase in the dispersion of 
the voters’ preferences we should also observe an increase in the candidate’s ambiguity. 
This is consistent with the model by Glazer (1990), that suggested that candidates’ 
ambiguity originates from the uncertainty over the median voter preference position.
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(i) (2)
VARIABLES Amb Amb
Sd.V 0.275 0.247
(0.122)* (0.121)*
Bias 0.025 0.016
(0.041) (0.043)
Opp-Bias -0.032 -0.040
(0.043) (0.044)
In -0.450 -0.427
(0.150)** (0.152)**
I n * A pprJn 0.184 0.176
(0.072)* (0.073)*
S  d-S tate.economy 0.275
(0.135)*
SdJN ationjeconomy 0.218
(0.174)
Close 0.289 0.237
(0.305) (0.264)
Cl * Bias -0.321 -0.296
(0.151)* (0.138)*
Cl * Opp-Bias -0.160 -0.138
(0.147) (0.131)
Observations 99 99
R-squared 0.36 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
Table 2: Results with robust standard errors
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In the next section we investigate whether this result is robust to the use of a different 
measure of dispersion of the preferences.
3.6.2 Incumbency effects
The second interesting aspect that we can notice is the presence of incumbency effects. 
Being the incumbent for a seat is correlated with a lower uncertainty of the voters 
on the ideological positioning of the politician. This is a natural effect, that is due to 
the fact that the incumbent is better known by the voters, so that his positioning is 
more clear. This also shows that this measure of ambiguity is problematic; it is clear 
that we cannot fully disentangle the uncertainty due to the candidate’s vagueness 
during the campaign from the uncertainty due to low visibility. We try to take this 
into account introducing controls as previous government experience, and the voters’ 
degree of interest in the elections and of information about politics.
More interestingly, we notice that a higher approval rate of the incumbent is corre­
lated with lower levels of ambiguity during the electoral campaign.27 This is consistent 
with the prediction by Alesina and Cuckierman (1990); in their model incumbents that 
are more popular are more prone to be precise in their policies (that in their model 
implies that they are more prone to implement a policy that is precisely targeting their 
most preferred outcome, in this way revealing their ideology). As we were discussing 
in the introduction, however, we do not claim to elicit any causal relation with this 
analysis, given the absence of an identification strategy. This correlation could there­
fore be due, for example, to a reverse causation mechanism; it could be that more 
precise politicians are preferred by the electorate, or even that the electorate exert 
more effort to acquire information relative to the preferred candidate. In any case, 
the empirical correlation does not contradict Alesina and Cuckierman’s model.
However, the incumbent’s approval rate is not the only possible test of this predic­
tion. Alesina and Cuckierman interpret popularity as a greater likelihood of winning 
the election. Therefore, focusing on those incumbents who face a very tight race, we 
would in principle look at the behaviour of incumbents that are not popular in the 
sense described above. It would thus be interesting to look at the coefficients of the 
interaction term between closeness of the race and the incumbency status. Unfortu­
nately, there are not enough data on incumbents facing a close race to allow us to 
implement this analysis.
3.6.3 Effect of the candidate’s ideological bias
Two of the models (Chappell (1994) and Chapter 1 of this thesis) have predictions 
about the correlation between the candidates’ ideological biases and their level of 
ambiguity. If we look at the direct effect of the biases, we see that no coefficient is
27In interpreting the coefficient, we need to remember that the scale that is used has 1 as the highest 
level of approval, and 5 as the lowest one.
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significantly different from zero. This result is robust across specifications, and across 
methods of estimation.28 One possible reason for this is that we merge situations 
in which candidates have completely different incentives in revealing or not revealing 
their ideological positioning. An extreme candidate who is sure that he will never 
win the current race, may have incentive to stress his extreme positions for reasons 
that are not related to the Senate seat he is running for, and that may be due to his 
position in the party, for example.
There is however a case in which the candidates have the greatest incentives to 
behave strategically: the case in which the race is very tight. In this case the stake 
is very high, and the candidates’ main focus should really be the maximisation of 
the probability of being elected, given that it is still possible for both of them to 
do so. We use polling data that are included in our dataset, and we restrict the 
analysis to those candidates running in very competitive races. If we look at the 
interaction term between the close races and the biases of the candidates, we see that 
the own bias is negatively correlated with the level of ambiguity. This is consistent 
with Chapter 1, that predicts a negative correlation between the own bias and the 
level of ambiguity. The finding is not consistent with Chappell’s model, as he predicts 
a positive correlation between own bias and ambiguity. Both the model included 
in Chapter 1, and Chappell’s model predict also a positive correlation between the 
opponent’s bias and the ambiguity level; this correlation, however, cannot be found 
in the data.
3.6.4 Real world effects
We try to see whether there is a correlation between the variability of the underlying 
state of the world and the level of ambiguity in the campaign. To do so we consider 
the state of the world as being the state of the economy, and we look at the survey 
questions that investigate the respondent’s beliefs about the state of the economy 
(both at State and Nation levels). We take then the standard deviation of these 
beliefs as a measure of the uncertainty about the current state of the world. As it 
can be seen in Table 2, the uncertainty about the economy both at national and local 
levels seems to be correlated with the ambiguity level of the campaign, even though 
only at the State level the effect is significantly positive. This is consistent with one of 
the structural hypothesis of Chapter 1, as the existence of such correlation is crucial 
for that model of vagueness in the electoral campaigns.
3.6.5 Other effects
The full analysis (see Table 4) also shows a positive correlation between the level of 
ambiguity and the voter’s level of interest in the campaign, and between ambiguity
28As it can be seen in the appendix, the same result hold if we use OLS, and if we use robust 
standard errors.
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(1) (2)
F(3, 78) 
Prob > F
0.29 0.49 
0.8331 0.6891
Ho: model has no omitted variables 
Table 3: Ramsey RESET test
and C l* P , implying that in close elections the democrats tend to be more ambiguous. 
This last effect, however, cannot be identified uniquely as the effect of the party; in 
those election that axe classified as close, there are no incumbents coming from the 
Democratic Party, while there are several Republican incumbents. Therefore this 
could simply be an effect of the fact that incumbents are in general better known than 
challengers.
The effect of the voter’s level of interest, instead, seems to be a relevant one, even 
though it is not included in any of the analysed models.
3.7 R ob u stn ess checks
This section provides few robustness checks and discusses the choice of the estimation 
method, and the problems that may arise.
3.7.1 Estim ation m ethod
As mentioned above, the regressions we consider may have endogeneity problems. In 
particular, the variables that may create problems are the following:
- In  and In*A pprJn: the level of ambiguity of the incumbent may affect his approval
rate, and therefore the likelihood of running for the considered election (and 
therefore his status of incumbent);
- close: the level of the ambiguity of the candidates may affect the likelihood that the
race is perceived as being tight; we try to prevent this by considering an early 
measure of closeness, but we cannot completely rule out this possibility. When 
we use CloseJLate to conduct a robustness check (see section 3.6.2) this is an 
even stronger concern;
- Bias: given that we use the voter’s perception of the candidate’s positioning to
compute the candidate’s bias, it might be that the level of ambiguity affects the 
perception of the positioning in a way that makes Bias an endogenous variable.
As for the specification, even though we cannot rule out the possibility that there 
are omitted variables that affect the result, we performed the RESET specification 
test and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are no omitted variables.
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3.7.2 Variables
In the above analysis we made some choices on the measure of some of the explanatory 
variables. In this section we investigate how the results would change if we change 
the explanatory variables that are used.
Election outcom e Let’s start considering the election outcome variable. In the 
main analysis we used as a measure of the tightness of the political race the early Cook 
report projection of the likelihood of the different electoral outcomes. The dataset also 
includes a later measurement of the same variable. The effect of the early variable 
should be more relevant, because it describes the situation at the stage in which the 
politicians are planning their strategies. The late polling variable, instead, is more 
endogenous, in the sense that it also includes the effects of the electoral campaign. 
Therefore it should have a lower impact on the analysis of the candidates’ behaviour. 
Table 5, in the Appendix, shows the results of the regressions when we use the late 
measure of race tightness. It is possible to notice that the coefficients of the interaction 
terms that include Close-Late, the late measure of closeness, axe no longer significant.
Previous experience In the previous analysis we defined the dummy variable 
Gov-Exp as having value 1 when the candidate had previous government experience 
in either Federal government, or State government or Local government. One may 
argue that this is a too generous characterisation of the candidate’s previous experi­
ence. We consider a more restrictive measure of experience Gov-Expl that has value 
1 only when the candidate has previous Federal or State government experience. The 
results of the analysis are substantially equivalent to the main one, and are contained 
in the Appendix, in Table 6.
3.8 P ossib le  ex ten sion s
The empirical work contained in this chapter is a first overview on the fink between 
the theoretical models of political ambiguity and the available data. At this stage, 
there are several possible extensions of this work, both into the direction of using a 
different dataset, and in the direction of focusing on a specific model and using more 
advanced econometric techniques to test it. Both possibilities are briefly described 
below.
Presidential data The ANES dataset includes also data on the Presidential elec­
tions. These data are more detailed in the sense that they allow the researcher to 
build measures of candidates’ ambiguity on specific issues. However, given the nature 
of the Presidential elections, there axe less datapoints available for use.
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D ata on the candidates’ true ideology One of the main aspects that we are 
not able to analyse properly with the kind of data that are used in this Chapter is 
the difference between the candidate’s true ideological bias and the perception that 
the voters have of his positioning. This is due to the way in which we measure the 
candidates’ bias, using as raw data the voters’ perception of the candidates’ bias. 
Further information is however available in the dataset for those candidates who have 
been in the office in the form of roll call votes, and on their relative positioning in the 
liberal conservative scale. The problem with using this information lies exactly in the 
fact that this objective information has however a relative, and not absolute, nature, 
and it cannot therefore be considered as a direct proxy of the ideological bias of the 
candidate; for example, being exactly the average politician can mean different things 
in terms of being liberal when the Senate is mostly conservative or when the Senate 
is mostly liberal.
A different m ethodological approach A very interesting extension of this chap­
ter is to repeat the same analysis using the mehtodology introduced by Bartels (1986). 
Bartels develops a model of voting under uncertainty, based on the Enelow-Hinich 
model (Enelow and Hinich, 1981), where he assumes that the voters’ perception of 
the candidates’ statements generates some uncertainty on the candidates’ positioning. 
Voter z’s belief on candidate j ’s positioning on issue k is a distribution with a mean 
Mijk and variance V^k- The magnitude of V^k is therefore the internal uncertainty 
of voter i, and is considered on top of any variability of beliefs that may exist across 
voters. In this respect, Bartels captures more precisely than Campbell the voter’s 
individual uncertainty. The author develops then a model of survey response under 
the assumption that the respondent places the candidate if he is sufficiently certain 
of his position (i.e. if Vijk is sufficiently low), and that he refuses to position the 
candidate if the uncertainty level is higher than a certain threshold. His two steps 
procedure enables him to have a more efficient use od the data that allows him to have 
an estimate of the individual degree of uncertainty of each respondent, and therefore 
to focus his analysis only on data from one (Presidential) election. This methodol­
ogy is complementary to Campbell’s one, in the sense that it captures the effects of 
candidates’ ambiguity on the internal uncertainty of the voters, and it leaves out the 
effects on the point estimates of the candidates’ positioning.
3.9 C onclusions
In this chapter we considered some of the most relevant papers who analyse the 
problem of ambiguity in the electoral campaign, and we compared their implications 
with the empirical correlations between the level of candidate’s ambiguity and several 
explanatory variables. The data come from the National Election Studies on Senate 
elections from 1988 to 1992.
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We found that the following implications are consistent with the empirical corre­
lations that are found in the data:
• Alesina and Cuckierman (1990): incumbents that are more popular are more 
precise in their policy announcements;
• Glazer (1990): candidates are more ambiguous when voters’ preferences are more 
dispersed;
• Chapter 1: candidates are more ambiguous when the state of the world is more 
uncertain (where the empirical correlation is found considering the National 
economy as underlying state of the world);
• Chapter 1: candidates are more ambiguous when they are less biased.
The last implication is confirmed by the data only in settings in which there is a 
close electoral race, and it contradicts the model included in Chappell (1994)
Moreover we don’t find any empirical correlation between the level of ambiguity 
of the candidate and his opponent’s bias, when the election results are very uncer­
tain; both the models that analyse this relation, that is Chappel’s model, and the 
one included in Chapter 1 of this thesis, predict a positive correlation between these 
variables.
A  A p p en d ix
A .l  Survey questions
Here’s a list of the survey questions that have been used in this analysis:
vps0031: Some people don’t pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would 
you say that you were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested?
1 . Very Much Interested;
3. Somewhat Interested;
5. Not Much Interested;
8 . Don’t know.
vps0035: How many stories did you read, see or hear regarding the campaign in this state for the
U.S. Senate? Would you say you read saw or heard a good many, several, just one or two, or none?
1 . None;
3. Just One or Two;
5. Several;
7. A Good Many;
8 . Don’t know.
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vps0352: Summary of the approval rate of running senate incumbent (Built from V349, 350, 351)
1. Approve strongly;
2 . Approve not strongly;
4. Disapprove not strongly;
5. Disapprove strongly;
8 . Don’t know.
vps0542: (Summary of vps 0539, vps0540, vps0541) Now, thinking about the country as a whole,
would you say that over the past year, the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, 
or gotten worse?
1. Much better off;
2 . Somewhat better off;
3. Same;
4 . Somewhat worse off;
5. Much worse off;
8 . Don’t know.
vps0546: (Summary of vps 0543, vps0544, vps0545) What about economic conditions in this
state? Would you say that over the past year, economic conditions in this state have gotten better, 
stayed about the same or gotten worse?
1. Much better off;
2 . Somewhat better off;
3. Same;
4 . Somewhat worse off;
5. Much worse off;
8 . Don’t know.
vps0547: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Think about a ruler 
for measuring political views that people might hold, from liberal to conservative. On this ruler, which 
goes from one to seven, a measurement of one means very liberal political views, and a measurement 
of seven would be very conservative. Just like a regular ruler, it has points in between, at 2, 3, 4, 5 
or 6 . Where would you place yourself on this ruler, remembering that 1 is very liberal and 7 is very 
conservative, or haven’t you thought much about this?
1. Very Liberal;
2.
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
7 . Very Conservative;
8 . Don’t know.
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vps0754: Where would R place the Democratic candidate on the liberal/conservative scale where
one means very liberal and seven means very conservative?
1. Very Liberal;
2 .
3 .
4.
5 .
6 .
7. Very Conservative;
8 . Don’t know.
vps0755: Where would R place the Republican candidate on the liberal/conservative scale where 
one means very liberal and seven means very conservative?
1. Very Liberal;
2 .
3 .
4.
5 .
6 .
7. Very Conservative;
8 . Don’t know.
vpsl389: Early (5-31-88,5-31-90,5-31-92) Cook Report projection of the election outcome:
0 . Safe Democratic;
1. Democrat favored;
2. Leaning Democratic;
3 . No clear favorite;
4. Leaning Republican;
5 . Republican favored;
6 . Safe Republican.
vpsl390: Late (10-28-88/10-28-90/10-28-92) Cook Report projection of the election outcome:
0 . Safe Democratic;
1 . Democrat favored;
2. Leaning Democratic;
3 . No clear favorite;
4. Leaning Republican;
5. Republican favored;
6 . Safe Republican.
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vpsl473: Democrat’s highest level of education completed:
0. Grade school;
1. Some high school;
2. High school graduate;
3. Some college/technical school;
4. College graduate;
5. Some graduate school;
6. Masters;
7 . Ph.D. or other doctoral degree (except M.D., but including veterinarians, dentists);
8. J.D., L.L.B, or equivalent law degree;
9. M.D.
vps1 4 7 5 :  Democrat’s most recent prior employer:
1. Self
2. Other private
3. Federal Government
4. State Government
5 . Local Government
vpsl673: Republican’s highest level of education completed:
0. Grade school;
1. Some high school;
2. High school graduate;
3. Some college/technical school;
4. College graduate;
5 . Some graduate school;
6. Masters;
7 . Ph.D. or other doctoral degree (except M.D., but including veterinarians, dentists);
8. J.D., L.L.B, or equivalent law degree;
9. M.D.
vpsl675: Republican’s most recent prior employer:
1. Self
2. Other private
3. Federal Government
4. State Government
5 . Local Government
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A .2 Definition of the variables
Here’s the list (in alphabetical order) of the variables used, and their definitions.29
• Age: it’s the age of the candidate;
• Amb: it’s the standard deviation of the candidate’s positioning (variables vps0754 and vps0755, 
fixing the state and the year that identify the candidate);
• Bias: it’s the absolute variable of the difference between the mean positioning of the candidate 
(mean of variable vps0754 or vps0755 fixing the state and the year) and the median voter’s 
position (median of vps0547 given the state and the year);
•  Cl * Bias: it is the interaction term between the variable Close and the variable Bias;
•  Cl-L * Bias: it is the interaction term between the variable Close-Late and the variable Bias;
•  Cl-L * Opp-Bias: it is the interaction term between the variable CloseJLate and the variable 
Opp-Bias;
•  Cl-L * P: it is the interaction term between the variable Close-Late and the variable P;
• Cl*Opp-Bias: it is the interaction term between the variable Close and the variable Opp-Bias;
•  Close: it’s a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the variable vpsl389 takes value 3 (=No 
clear favorite);
•  C l o s e L a t e :  it’s a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the variable vpsl390 takes value 3 (=No 
clear favorite);
•  C l*  P: it is the interaction term between the variable Close and the variable P;
•  Edu: it represents the level of education as expressed in variables vpsl473 and vpsl673;
•  Gov-Exp: it is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the variable vpsl475 or vpsl675 (de­
pending on the candidate) take values 3 (=Federal Government), 4 (=State Government), or 
5(=Local Government);
•  Gov-Expl: it is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the variable vpsl675 or vpsl675 
(depending on the candidate) take values 3 (=Federal Government), or 4(=State Government);
•  In: it is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candidate is the incumbent;
•  In  * Appr-In: it is an interaction term between the variable In  and the variable Appr-In, 
which is the mean of variable vps0352;
•  Opp-Bias: it’s the B ias  of the opponent’s (defined as the candidate of the opposing party 
competing in the same year and State);
•  P: it is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candidate belongs to the Democratic Party, 
and 0 if he belongs to the Republican Party;
•  Sd-Nation-economy: it’s the standard deviation of the variable vps0542;
•  SdState-econom y: it’s the standard deviation of the variable vps0546;
•  Sdv- it’s the standard deviation of the variable vps0547;
•  V-Infd-Politics: it’s the mean of the variable vps0035;
•  V.Interest: it’s the mean of the variable vps0031.
A .3 Tables
The complete tables of the main regression and of the robustness checks are displayed in the next
pages.
29Notice that we considered the answers ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refused’ as missing values when we 
computed means and standard deviations.
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(i) (2)
VARIABLES Amb Amb
Sd-V 0.275 0.247
(0.122)* (0.121)*
Bias 0.025 0.016
(0.041) (0.043)
OppJBias -0.032 -0.040
(0.043) (0.044)
In -0.450 -0.427
(0.150)** (0.152)**
In  * A pprJn 0.184 0.176
(0.072)* (0.073)*
S  d-S tate-economy 0.275
(0.135)*
Sd-Nation-economy 0.218
(0.174)
Close 0.289 0.237
(0.305) (0.264)
Cl * Bias -0.321 -0.296
(0.151)* (0.138)*
Cl * Opp-Bias -0.160 -0.138
(0.147) (0.131)
Age 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Edu 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Gov-Exp -0.070 -0.066
(0.046) (0.045)
V -Interest 0.197 0.222
(0.053)** (0.061)**
V  _Info-Politics 0.072 0.089
(0.057) (0.058)
C U P 0.239 0.243
(0.113)* (0.105)*
P 0.046 0.045
(0.042) (0.042)
Constant -0.012 -0.061
(0.426) (0.453)
Observations 99 99
R-squared 0.36 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
Table 4: Full set of results with robust standard errors
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(i) (2)
VARIABLES Amb Amb
Sd-V 0.286 0.252
(0.128)* (0.128)
Bias 0.011 0.001
(0.044) (0.046)
OppJ3ias -0.032 -0.041
(0.040)) (0.040)
In -0.345 -0.326
(0.158)* (0.162)*
In  * A pprJn 0.121 0.115
(0.074) (0.076)
S  d-State-economy 0.278
(0.139)*
S  d-Nati onjeconomy 0.146
(0.190)
CloseLate 0.072 -0.027
(0.188) (0.166)
CIl * bias 0.034 0.088
(0.115) (0.108)
CLL  * Opp-Bias 0.061 0.116
(0.122) (0.115)
Age 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Edu 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Gov-Exp -0.060 -0.055
(0.045) (0.044)
V  -Interest 0.202 0.212
(0.054)** (0.060)**
Vjnfo-Politics 0.076 0.089
(0.054) (0.056)
CLL  * P -0.129 -0.127
(0.103) (0.099)
P 0.080 0.078
(0.041) (0.042)
Constant -0.082 0.005
(0.450) (0.483)
Observations 99 99
R-squared 0.36 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
Table 5: Robustness check 1: late measure of closeness
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(i) (2)
VARIABLES Amb Amb
Sd-V 0.271 0.244
(0.122)* (0.122)*
Bias 0.016 0.008
(0.042) (0.044)
OppJBias -0.035 -0.042
(0.043) (0.043)
In -0.447 -0.426
(0.154)** (0.157)**
In  * A p p r ln 0.181 0.174
(0.074)* (0.074)*
S  dState-economy 0.278
(0.131)*
SdJN ationjeconomy 0.193
(0.165)
Close 0.254 0.199
(0.249) (0.217)
Cl * Bias -0.296 -0.270
(0.128)* (0.119)*
Cl * Opp-Bias -0.150 -0.127
(0.126) (0.113)
Age 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Edu 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Gov-Expl -0.078 -0.071
(0.041) (0.040)
V  In te re s t 0.193 0.214
(0.052)** (0.058)**
V  . I n f  o-Politics 0.083 0.098
(0.056) (0.057)
CLP 0.230 0.235
(0.100)* (0.095)*
P 0.048 0.046
(0.042) (0.042)
Constant -0.039 -0.052
(0.420) (0.448)
Observations 99 99
R-squared 0.37 0.35
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%
Table 6: Robustness check 2: government experience
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